By Jonathan Schanzer - POLICYWATCH #729 - March 21,

An apparently spontaneous protest stopped traffic in
Cairo's Tahrir Square Thursday. Protesting the allied attack
on Iraq, some of the participants turned violent, overturning police blockades. In Damascus, riot police fired tear gas on hundreds of protesters who threw rocks and tried to rush
the U.S. embassy. Several smaller demonstrations were
also reported in Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip.
Today, more protests occurred in Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, and Manama. In Yemen, a shootout
was reported between police and antiwar protesters
marching on the U.S. embassy in Sanaa. These incidents support the idea of a dangerous "Arab street," reflecting
a disaffected Arab public incensed at U.S. policy. What is
the impact of Arab antiwar opinion on regional stability?

Recent Warnings and Protests
Last summer, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak warned that "disorder and chaos may prevail in the region" should America attack Iraq. A host of Arab and Muslim countries cautioned the United Nations last month that the "extent
of destabilization in the region and uncertainty in Iraq in
the case of a war go far beyond our imagination." A
Jordanian diplomat predicted "serious repercussions."
Despite these warnings, demonstrations in the months
leading to war were relatively moderate, both in size and
tone. This suggests that regional regimes took the
necessary measures to maintain control.

In early January, a mere 200 antiwar demonstrators
protested at the U.S. embassy in Lebanon. In Yemen, a
slightly larger crowd chanted, "No to regime change by
force." In Bahrain, some 100 youths carried banners
proclaiming "No to war in Iraq" and "Death to America." In Cairo, an estimated 50 Egyptians held a silent protest, brandishing posters that denounced U.S. president George
W. Bush as a "Neo-Nazi." Turnout was a little more
impressive in Cairo on January 18, when a march drew
1,000. These numbers, however, have paled next to concurrent mass protests in Washington, Paris, and

The fizzling of the Arab street prompted one Egyptian columnist to complain that the protests "were
embarrassing," asking, "Where did all the anger go?" One explanation is that Arab demonstrators must often obtain a plethora of permits ahead of time, and, even when
permission is granted, protests may only be carried out in ways approved by the government. In Jordan, for example, Islamists held a prewar demonstration that brought out
5,000, but promised that continued demonstrations would be "in full respect of the law." Another explanation for the absence of mass protests in the Arab world is that most demonstrations are heavily policed; protestors lament that
demonstrations often result in "a rally of 300 people
cordoned by some 3,000 antirally policemen using tear gas and batons to disperse the crowd."

Co-opting the Street
As war approached, demonstrations did appear to increase
in number and intensity. But rather than reflecting an
emerging confrontation with regimes, the "street" acted in
a decidedly nonthreatening manner, suggesting that Arab regimes were still in control. In February, some 140,000 gathered in Cairo International Stadium for a demonstration
organized by labor unions and opposition parties. In March, about 160,000 reportedly marched in Casablanca, Morocco. These demonstrations were ordered, well regulated and,
with few exceptions, disturbance-free.

Taking a cue from the popular stadium rally, Mubarak's
National Democratic Party itself organized the region's
largest protest rally, with 600,000 reported participants.
One news account stated, "the heavy presence of
employees from state companies -- mainly oil firms like
Petrobel, Petrojet and Misr -- cast doubt on whether the turnout was altogether spontaneous." Indeed, Mubarak appears in this case to have manipulated the Arab street
for political gain. Similarly, Yemeni president Ali Abdullah
Salleh has called for several large protests in recent
months, drawing up to 200,000 at one. Earlier this month,
he took the opportunity to make several antiwar
statements to appease his public ahead of the forthcoming April 27 Yemeni elections, and allowed Yemen's public to
vent through nonviolent demonstrations. Other Arab
regimes -- Syria, Lebanon, Sudan -- have also followed this model, with up to 200,000 marching in Damascus before the war. Because demonstrations do not occur in these
countries without the written consent or, at times, the prodding of the authorities, it is clear that Arab governments have found a way to exploit antiwar sentiment, rather than suppress it, for fear it will ultimately turn against them.

The Street in Context
Despite exaggerated claims, the Arab street has had only limited success in affecting Arab politics. As David Pollock
noted in a 1992 study, "There has not been a successful popular uprising . . . for at least the past thirty-five years, if ever." Echoing this theme, Egyptian scholar Saad Eddin Ibrahim recently recalled "a time when the Arab street could make or break policies. But over the past quarter of a
century, Arab regimes have succeeded in emasculating this street." Analyst Daniel Pipes notes that the Arab street has consistently failed to erupt when expected, particularly after polarizing incidents such as the 1982 killings in Sabra and Shatila or after the 1989 fatwa against author Salman Rushdie. Similarly, during the 1991 Gulf War, major
demonstrations were few and tame; most of the "Arab
street" watched the war on television. Perhaps most stunningly, the Palestinian uprising of 1988-1991 failed to trigger sustained mass protests anywhere in the Arab

There are, of course, exceptions; popular demonstrations
do occasionally have important political effects. The coups
in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), and Sudan (1969) had some popular participation. And in the 1980s and 1990s, local regimes in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and
Jordan felt the impact of "bread riots" -- protests against economic deterioration, domestic mismanagement, and the
apparent high-handedness of international financial institutions. Indeed, when Arab demonstrators have come
out in force, it has generally been to protest the actions of their own governments. In 2000, for instance, as many as
a million people took to the streets of Morocco to protest
their government's plans to enhance women's rights.

But another important exception is the recent Arab street reaction to Arab-Israeli violence. When the second intifada erupted in late September 2000, thousands took to the streets on numerous occasions. Participation reached a
peak in April 2002, with Israel's Operation Defensive Shield and related Jenin events.

While disconcerting, the demonstrations to date appear to have posed little threat to regional security and Arab
regimes. In their present form, they have served as a vent
for anger against both local regimes and the allied invasion
of Iraq. None reflect a surge in popular support for Saddam Husayn. An important "street" to watch, however, is Jordan,
home to hundreds of thousands of Iraqi expatriates as well
as millions of Palestinians. Currently, Amman downplays the prospects of street violence, but has warned that
"maintaining calm and order will become more difficult the longer the duration of the war."

Unauthorized protests are likely to continue in Arab capitals, while regimes take steps to maintain control. The situation
will be an important one to monitor. The speed, pace, and severity of events in Iraq could alter the pattern of demonstrations in the days and weeks to come.

Jonathan Schanzer is a Soref fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in Arab and Islamic politics.

Survival of the Skittish
Is the Arab world on board?
By Jonathan Schanzer - National Review Online - March 18, 2003

So much for Arab unity. Despite the repeated and emphatic declarations of unity with Iraq, the recent televised brawl between Arab leaders at the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Qatar showed that the Arab world is actually anything but unified. As it turns out, much of the Arab world will now back the imminent U.S. invasion.

Of course, we should all be thankful of Arab support. Indeed, we should take note that a solid number of Arab states are proving to be better allies than the French or the Germans. It's also important to note, however, that a familiar reality has emerged — one of every Arab nation for itself. Syria, Yemen, and Egypt are standing together in opposition, but many other Arab nations have decided that Saddam can burn.

The Iraqis, of course, are upset with the Kuwaitis for allowing more than 75,000 U.S. troops on Kuwaiti soil, with another 40,000 on ships offshore — all in preparation for the coming war. The Kuwaitis, for their part, are justified. They remember very clearly the seven-month Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in Gulf War I. When his troops were finally ousted, Saddam set fire to Kuwait's oil wells. Today, plenty of Kuwaitis would be happy to see him roast.

For cooperating with the U.S., the Iraqi vice president went so far as to say, "Damn your mustache!" to the Kuwaiti representative. Whatever that means.

But Kuwait is not alone. The tiny peninsula state of Qatar is also quietly supporting the U.S. invasion, but for different reasons. To begin with, of course, Qatar would be happy to see the most power-hungry despot in the Gulf get what's coming to him. But it goes beyond that. In 2000, Qatar offered the American military a state-of-the-art airbase called Al-Udeid, correctly calculating that an American presence on their soil would help ensure security in their dangerous neighborhood. They also reasoned that the U.S. presence would postpone a costly overhaul to their feeble military.

The deal with the U.S. military was also a very effective way for Qatar to thumb its nose at the Saudis, their major Persian Gulf foe. Because the Saudis have rejected American demands to be allowed to attack Iraq from Saudi soil, Qatar will now be the headquarters of the U.S. central command for the entire war.

Even the Saudis have reconsidered their position in recent days. After initially denying access to Iraq from the Prince Sultan Airbase, they recently agreed to allow for "defensive" U.S. air operations from Saudi territory, should war erupt. This would not include bombing raids, but would allow for refueling missions, AWACS surveillance, and the interception of Iraqi jets illegally entering the southern "no-fly" zone. The Saudis evidently don't want to be left out of the decision-making process when Iraq is rebuilt.

And don't forget the United Arab Emirates. In a move that utterly destroyed the façade of Arab unity, the UAE recently proposed sending Saddam into exile, as a way of sparing the region from war. The UAE was backed by Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait. None of the leaders in these small countries feel powerful enough to endure the stresses that a war would place on their corrupt governments. And none of them want Saddam around.

Jordan is another interesting case. Last fall, King Abdullah launched a campaign called al-Urdun Awalan, or "Jordan First," stressing Jordanian nationalism above Arab nationalism. Abdullah's stated goal was to "promote loyalty to [the] homeland." The campaign was a response to brewing domestic tensions sparked by the looming war in Iraq. In essence, he told his subjects — and the Arab world — that in the event of a war, Jordan would do what it needed to do to protect itself, irrespective of calls for Arab solidarity.

Today, while calling for peace, Jordan is simultaneously allowing for a clandestine but substantial U.S. presence — including troops, antimissile batteries, and radar. In exchange, Jordan will be compensated with thousands of barrels of free oil, increased foreign aid, and lots of new military gadgetry.

So as it turns out, American interests and Arab interests seem to have more in common than previously believed.

For its part, the U.S. should no longer operate under the delusion that the Arab world is interested in larger Arab ideals. It should also ignore ominous warnings of the so-called Arab street. These concerns and ideals inevitably yielded to the Arabs' hatred for Saddam and their common interest in shaping in Iraq's future. Arab leaders also know that cooperation with the U.S. is likely to pay dividends in the long run.

In fact, history shows that when it comes to U.S. military action in the Gulf, while Arab states will kick and scream, they will eventually come on board. In a part of the world where self-preservation is the rule, call it survival of the skittish.

Jonathan Schanzer is a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Professors For Terrorist Al-Arian
By Jonathan Schanzer - FrontPageMagazine.com - February 24, 2003

Why did so many American professors blindly lend their support over the years to Sami Al-Arian, the University of South Florida professor indicted last week by a federal
grand jury for heading up the terrorist operations of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in America?More pointedly,
why did they fail to condemn the deplorable actions
attributed to him?

While the charges piled up in recent years, Georgetown’s
John Esposito stressed Al-Arian's “professional competence and stellar teaching record.”Anthony Sullivan of the
University of Michigan declared that Al-Arian “is a quintessential political moderate.” Louis Cantori, professor
of political science at the University of Baltimore, insisted
that Al-Arian is not “a political radical…Period.”

Last week’s novel-length grand jury indictment, meanwhile, charges that Al-Arian utilized “the structure, facilities and academic environment of USF to conceal the activities of the PIJ.” These activities included recruitment, fundraising, extortion, racketeering, obstruction, and immigration fraud, among others.

Nearly a decade of wiretapping and other surveillance inextricably links Al-Arian to the upper crust of PIJ in
Damascus. It also points to his manipulation of “all moneys and property of the PIJ throughout the world.” The
indictment even states that Al-Arian sent a fax to “Saudi Arabia, and inquired about obtaining pelletized urea
fertilizer [a chemical compound used in explosives] in fifty kilogram bags suitable for ocean transportation.”

To be fair, the professors could not have known such
details at the time. But Al-Arian’s dealings have been questionable for nearly a decade. In 1994, a documentary entitled “Jihad in America” by journalist Steven Emerson reported Al-Arian’s ties to terror through the founding of a
PIJ front group, the Islamic Committee for Palestine. Subsequently, reports surfaced that Al-Arian worked with Hassan al-Turabi (a Sudanese radical ideologue), Sheikh
Omar Abdul Rahman (the “blind sheikh” behind the 1993
World Trade Center bombing), Ramadan Abdullah Shallah
(who went directly from USF to become secretary of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad), and others. Why did the
professors not unite against this?

When USF finally moved to suspend Al-Arian (after he made controversial terror-related statements without noting they were not the views of USF), a number of prominent
professors rallied blindly behind him, submitting letters of protest to the USF president. It should be noted that these professors were defending Al-Arian’s tenure and his right
to unpopular speech. This was their right. None, however, denounced the actual terror ties attributed to their

Most of them only focused on clearing his name. Indeed,
they seemed to elieve that their personal affinity for the
man would exonerate him. Sullivan stated that he had “enormous respect” for the USF professor, “both as a scholar and as a human being.” Esposito proclaimed that
Al-Arian was “a consummate professional.”

Still others harped on their belief that Al-Arian’s suspension was the result of a Muslim-bashing smear campaign. John
Voll at Georgetown’s Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding condemned USF for “caving in to public pressure at the expense of academic integrity,” citing “McCarthyite popular pressures for his dismissal.”
Peter Erlinder of William Mitchell College of Law in
Minnesota chimed in by saying that the entire affair
“smacks of anti-communist witch hunts of the past.”

Similarly, Professor Ali Mazrui of the State University of
New York at Binghamton claimed that al-Arian was just a “victim of prejudice and of popular ill will.” Esposito expressed concern that Al-Arian not be a “victim of… anti-
Arab and anti-Muslim bigotry.” Charles Butterworth, a professor of politics at the University of Maryland,
characterized Al-Arian as a victim of “tyranny of the

Professorial associations also entered the fray. The
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) became “vocal in its support of Al-Arian as a matter of
union rights and academic freedom.”The group sent a committee to USF to interview administrators and faculty,
to uncover any wrongdoing when the school suspended
al-Arian, leaving open the possibility of censuring USF when
AAUP convenes in early June 2003. A censure, according to
one journalist, is “a drastic step that would make it harder
for the university to hire and retain quality faculty.”

Martin Kramer, author of Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure
of Middle Eastern Studies in North America, notes that the “most embarrassing endorsement” of Al-Arian likely
came from the Middle East Studies Association (MESA). The association’s board wrote a letter to USF last year:

dismissing accusations of Al-Arian's terrorist involvement as “old and never-proven.” MESA announced that “the Al-
Arian case is about academic freedom. It is also about the basic first amendment right to freedom of speech.”

Today, however, it is clear that this case is about more
than free speech. It is about terrorism and a number of
other criminal charges.

What do these professors say now? We have yet to hear.
In the meantime, it is clear that they have discredited themselves with this monumental lack of judgment.
Whether Al-Arian is found guilty or not, it’s time these professors come out and condemn the actions cited in the
indictment. Supporting free speech is one thing. Turning a
blind eye to terrorism is quite another.

By Jonathan Schanzer - POLICYWATCH #685 - December 6, 2002

The Central Command of the U.S. military reports that the biennial "Internal Look" exercise is slated to begin Monday at the as-Sayliyah base in Qatar. The operation is designed to test U.S. military reactions to various threats in the Middle East.

Qatar's strategic importance extends well beyond this exercise. The United States sees the al-Udeid air base, located some twenty miles outside Doha, as the likely nerve center for an attack on Iraq. The base boasts a 15,000-foot runway and is said to be capable of housing thousands of troops and dozens of aircraft. With 3,300 troops and untold amounts of military hardware already in place, Qatar is now lauded as America's new and notable ally in the Gulf.

With a Gulf war looming, the importance of this cooperation cannot be minimized. But the U.S.-Qatar alliance is murkier than it appears. Qatar's policies are not so much "pro-American" as they are pragmatic steps to offset instability, compensate for weak defenses, and undercut Qatar's foes.

Reality Check
Qatar, a country smaller than Connecticut, has recently received much praise in the American media. The New York Times dubbed Qatar "one of the most liberal, democratic countries in the traditionally tribal-ruled neighborhood." The Wall Street Journal reported that Qatar "has gone through a social revolution," providing "freedoms unheard of in most of the Arabian peninsula."

These broad brushstrokes are deceiving. Qatar's press, consisting of three mainstream Arab language newspapers (ash-Sharq, al-Watan, and ar-Raya), is heavily censored by the government. Even al-Jazeera, touted as the most independent television station in the Arab world, will not address sensitive domestic Qatari politics as long as it broadcasts from Doha. Dissent on the streets of Qatar is virtually nonexistent. There are no political parties in Qatar, and elections are never held at the executive level.

Still, free and fair municipal elections were held in 1999. Qatar should be lauded for undertaking a slow and painful process of liberalization, which sets it apart from many of its Arab neighbors. In other words, Qatar is a reforming but somewhat repressive democratic monarchy that is ruled by a self-serving elite.

Evading Military Overhaul
Allowing the United States to bulk up at al-Udeid has been construed as a measure of unwavering Qatari support for America. Following the September 11 attacks, Qatari emir Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa ath-Thani offered his unconditional support. He even paid for television ads pledging Qatari support for the "war on terror."

In all likelihood, however, this does not stem from sincere affinity for U.S. policies. More realistically, Qatar has made a pragmatic play for U.S. military and diplomatic protection.

From a population of about 750,000, only an estimated 130,000 are citizens. Thus, Qataris are outnumbered almost five to one by foreign nationals with work permits. Added precariousness stems from challenges posed by plotting rival members of the ath-Thani clan. A U.S. presence there may help bolster the regime's stability.

Further, Qatar's meager and poorly equipped military is unprepared to counter threats from any of its well-armed Gulf neighbors. Qatar built al-Udeid and offered it to the United States as an alternative to a costly military overhaul.

The American military presence in Qatar, ath-Thani hopes, will also safeguard Qatar's vast oil and gas reserves. According to Hassan al-Ansari, a Qatari strategist, "Qatar's interests lie in developing its extensive fossil fuel reserves . . . the largest known gas reserve in the world." Thus, the American presence is a "valuable form of insurance in a turbulent region."

A Blow to the Saudis
The American buildup at al-Udeid is also a poignant message to Qatar's biggest Gulf foe: Saudi Arabia. Rivaling Saudi Arabia as America's most vital military host in the Gulf is clearly a battle won for Qatar.

Tensions with Saudi Arabia have existed for years. Saudi and Qatari forces skirmished several times in the early 1990s over a border dispute dating back to 1935; this resulted in several deaths. After Shaykh Hamad overthrew his father Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad in 1995, Qatar accused the Saudis of orchestrating a failed coup in 1996 designed to bring Shaykh Khalifah back to power.

Recently, Saudi officials lambasted Qatar for anti-Saudi criticisms aired on al-Jazeera, broadcast from Qatari soil. After a series of diplomatic scuffles, the Saudis "decided to stop the welcoming of, or the dealing with, the Qatari emir and his foreign minister." The kingdom recalled its envoy to Qatar in late September.

America previously relied upon Saudi hospitality at the Combined Air Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base. Of late, however, Saudi Arabia announced its likely refusal to allow an attack on Iraq from its soil. Qatar, meanwhile, had offered al-Udeid to the Pentagon in 2000. Today, as the United States touts al-Udeid as the likely operation center for an attack on Iraq, Qatar has scored a considerable blow against its rival Saudi neighbors.

Pragmatism aside, many of Qatar's policies reflect disdain for America. Consider the case of al-Jazeera. The Arab television network's lack of criticism toward Qatar is an indication that it may take orders from the emirate. In fact, the channel has largely relied on funding from Qatar's government since it launched in 1996. With that funding, al-Jazeera frequently hosts guests who espouse vitriolic anti-American rhetoric. Whether intended or not, as the Arab world's most watched television network, al-Jazeera has played a role in propagating hatred against America both before and after September 11.

In addition, Qatar has (in its tenacious efforts to spite the Saudis) come out in support of Saddam Husayn. In November 2000, for example, a member of Qatar's royal family gave Saddam a Boeing 747 jumbo jet. Shaykh Hamad bin Ali bin Jabr ath-Thani said the personal gift was an _expression of solidarity with Saddam. While this was a thorn in the side of the House of Saud, it was also an affront to America, which sought to isolate Iraq for its violations of UN resolutions and efforts to build weapons of mass destruction.

While little is known of Qatari popular opinion (due to the ruling family's squelching of popular dissent), there is scant evidence of support for the United States, and some signs of opposition. According to one official, "There could be a popular backlash if Qatari soil is used by the U.S. for the destruction of Iraq." The New York Times has noted Qatari "popular distrust of American intentions."

Qatar may be liberalizing faster than its neighbors, but the fact remains that the U.S. government has become bedfellows with a closed regime that is most concerned with protecting a small ruling elite. Washington must not confuse this recent cooperation with an alliance based on shared values. After all, America has a similar relationship with the Saudi royal elite. That relationship has recently come under intense strain due to conflicting interests.

For the moment, and as long as it is consistent with the aims of the emir, Qatar will use cooperation with America to advance its security in the region. A change in leadership or political landscape could quickly precipitate a change in policy and put Washington back out on the market for yet another Gulf ally.

Jonathan Schanzer is a Soref fellow at The Washington Institute.

By Jonathan Schanzer - POLICYWATCH #680 - November 22, 2002

Last week's Jordanian government raid on the southern city of Maan was likely a tactic designed to insulate the kingdom from the possible repercussions of a U.S.-led war in Iraq. Indeed, the incident in Maan was a microcosm of larger Jordanian problems stemming from pro-Iraq, Palestinian, and Islamist opposition elements. Should war erupt, Jordan will almost certainly face challenges from these groups. It might also have to fend off a flood of Iraqi or Palestinian refugees, economic meltdown, or even military attack.

Jordan First
In late October, King Abdullah II launched a campaign called al-Urdun Awalan, or "Jordan First," stressing Jordanian nationalism among all citizens, regardless of origin, faith, or race. Abdullah's stated goal was to construct "a unified social fiber," promote "loyalty to [the] homeland," and cultivate "immunity against negative ideas." The campaign was apparently a response to brewing domestic tensions sparked by intensified violence in the West Bank and Gaza and a looming war in Iraq. These tensions underscore the deep societal divisions caused by partisans of Islamism as well as Arab, Iraqi, Palestinian, and Jordanian nationalisms.

"Jordan First" came on the heels of the October 28 assassination of U.S. Agency for International Development official Laurence Foley in Amman, which prompted the roundup of hundreds of the usual Islamist suspects. The arrests triggered a gunfight between Jordanian forces and wanted Islamist cleric Muhammed Chalabi. Chalabi escaped and found asylum with the tribes of Maan, one of Jordan's largest Islamist strongholds. This triggered last week's government siege of the city.

Maan notwithstanding, Islamism has long been a concern in Jordan. Although the local Muslim Brotherhood has historically sided with the monarchy in battles against Nasserists and radical Arab nationalists, it has also emerged as a scathing critic of the Jordanian establishment and a focal point for East Bank and Palestinian disaffection. In the 1989 and 1993 elections, Islamists emerged as the dominant bloc in Jordan's parliament and even held five ministerial portfolios during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. In 1997, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) -- the Brotherhood's political arm -- boycotted elections to protest the slow pace of reform, Jordan's peace agreements with Israel, and election laws that were likely to reduce Islamist parliamentary representation. Today, the IAF is Jordan's only substantial political party; all others are little more than fronts for various notables and chieftains. Amman fears that these political Islamists -- in addition to militant groups like Jaysh Muhammad, Takfir wa'l Hijra, and the Jordanian Islamic Jihad -- may attempt to exploit the instability that an Iraq crisis could bring. Officials have even noted that they may postpone elections (for a third time) to prevent sweeping Islamist victories.

Hashemite Palestine
Islamism is but one of Jordan's current complications. As one analyst has noted, Jordan has "the highest ratio of refugees to indigenous population of any country in the world." In fact, as many as 60 percent of Jordan's 5 million citizens are thought to be of Palestinian origin. Politically, few Jordanians have forgotten the various challenges posed by Palestinian nationalist movements, including the 1970 Black September crisis, the first Palestinian uprising (1988-1991), and the current Palestinian uprising. More recent confrontations include an April 2001 clash between Jordanian police and an estimated 15,000 Palestinian protestors, as well as sporadic face-offs between security forces and local Palestinians at Friday mosque sermons, at funerals for Palestinians killed in the West Bank and buried in Jordan, and at regular protests against "normalization" with Israel.

In the event of a U.S.-led attack against Iraq, officials fear that opposition factions would harness Palestinian frustrations to protest Jordan's close ties with Washington and the resilient peace with Israel. Another concern lies in the fact that more than 1 million refugees passed through Jordan during the previous Gulf War; more than 300,000 Palestinians with Jordanian passports stayed permanently. Although Israel did not instigate an exodus of Palestinians eastward a decade ago, Jordanian officials have recently expressed concern that Israel might exploit a new war in Iraq to deport large numbers of Palestinians to Jordan, setting off yet another demographic crisis. Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher noted that Israel "privately assured us this is contrary to their policies," but other officials have voiced concern that Israel has not issued an official statement to this effect. Accordingly, Jordan has adopted contingency plans to block Palestinian deportees.

To complicate the situation further, a large number of Jordanians support Saddam Husayn, primarily due to their Islamist, Ba'athist, or Arab nationalist allegiance. In 1990-91, many Jordanians hailed Saddam, touting lapel pins, wristwatches, and ornaments in his image, and numerous large-scale pro-Saddam protests have been held throughout the past decade. Saddam's cult of personality continues to grow in Jordan as America's Iraq policies grow increasingly unpopular. In the event of war, Jordan fears a sharp upturn in popularity among pro-Saddam cadres whose provocations could turn public demonstrations violent.

Equally worrisome is the large Iraqi population inside Jordan. Following the influx of some 150,000 Iraqi refugees over the past decade, officials estimate that there are 300,000 Iraqis living there today, most illegally. In September 2002, authorities reportedly began blocking the entry of would-be Iraqi immigrants. Moreover, Jordan has insisted that, in the event of war, relief efforts be set up on the Iraqi side of the border in order to minimize the influx of refugees.

Economic/Military Fallout
A weak state surrounded by stronger neighbors, Jordan knows it cannot determine the outcome of a showdown with Iraq. Instead, it has sought a tenuous balance. Amman supports full Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, yet calls for an end to economic sanctions. It opposes the use of its territory for American-led attacks, yet invites heightened cooperation with the U.S. military. A misstep in either direction could lead to a rebuke from the West (as was the case with the late King Hussein's attempt at neutrality in 1991) or an attack by Saddam (if he sees Jordan as a turncoat Arab neighbor). Economic fallout is another major concern. With official unemployment estimated at more than 15 percent, the Jordanian economy is already in crisis. As war looms, Amman is increasingly nervous about the status of its subsidized oil arrangement with Iraq, which saves the kingdom nearly $500 million per year. Hence, Abdullah has called for "an international arrangement that ensures supplies to Jordan" in the event that war halts the flow of Iraqi oil.

Policy Implications
In contrast to King Hussein's diplomatic stumble in 1991 -- which temporarily cost Jordan the friendship of the United States and hundreds of millions of aid dollars from Washington and various Gulf states -- Abdullah's "Jordan First" campaign is meant to safeguard Jordan's recent gains. So far, the Bush administration has responded wisely, granting Jordan an extra $85 million in assistance this year on top of the $150 million earmarked annually, and asking Congress to increase the aid level to $448 million in 2003. Washington could also contribute much by finding an altern5tors, as well as spoative supply of oil for Jordan. This issue has been too low on the list of U.S. (or, more specifically, U.S.-Saudi) priorities for the past decade; it now deserves high-level attention.

Domestically, there is little Washington can do to further bolster the Hashemites against the array of challenges they face. The Bush administration can only help those who help themselves. Accordingly, "Jordan First" is a step in the right direction.

Jonathan Schanzer is a Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

By Jonathan Schanzer - POLICYWATCH #676 - November 12, 2002

Last week's bombing of a coffee shop and car-bombing attack against a Fatah figure in Ein al-Hilweh, a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, are the latest developments in a wave of recent violence in the camp. Al-Sharq al-Awsat has reported no less than nineteen bombings in Ein al-Hilweh since the end of September 2002. Asbat al-Ansar (League of partisans) -- a predominantly Palestinian terrorist group based in the camp, with established links to al-Qaeda -- is seen as the culprit behind this violence. In an apparent move to ignite heightened Arab-Israeli tensions, the group has destabilized the camp and surrounding areas. Mounting tensions in this long-neglected and impoverished camp could undermine Lebanese stability, aggravate its refugee crisis, and enfeeble America's efforts in the "war on terror."

The Camp
Ein al-Hilweh is the largest of Lebanon's twelve Palestinian refugee camps. Located about 30 miles south of Beirut, it was established in 1948 with an original population of 9,000. Today, 44,133 refugees are registered in the camp, while an estimated 75,000 persons actually live there. Even after the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) entered the camp in 1952, Ein al-Hilweh was neglected for nearly two decades; factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) did not begin serving Lebanon's refugees until after the 1969 Cairo Agreement. The PLO presence was strengthened when the organization relocated to Lebanon from Jordan in 1970. After Israel expelled the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, Ein al-Hilweh again went neglected. In 1985, the camp was the site of pitched battles between the pro-Syrian Amal militia and pro-Arafat factions. In the wake of the first intifada, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) filled a political void and provided valuable social services. Fatah reasserted control in the 1990s, installing Arafat loyalists in camp committees. This resulted in the patchwork of factions that run the camp today. In November 2001, a formal security committee was created with delegates from each faction.

Meanwhile, the camp has become a breeding ground for a plethora of militant groups. The Associated Press reports regular "turf clashes" in a camp "known for lawlessness." These groups include Fatah, Ansar Allah (Sunni Islamist), al-Ahbash (pro-Syrian and anti-wahhabi), al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah (Sunni, pro-Iranian, and linked to Hizballah), Hamas, PIJ, and Asbat al-Ansar.

Currently, Palestinian refugees are second-class citizens in Lebanon. They are considered a threat in that their integration would upset the delicate balance between Lebanon's Christian, Maronite, Shi'a, and Sunni sects. Accordingly, Lebanon strictly limits employment and restricts travel. Moreover, a 1990 Lebanese constitutional amendment stipulates that there is to be "no settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon." The prevailing wisdom among the Lebanese is that the refugee problem is primarily an Israeli one, that internal politics justify delaying a solution, and that the problem will eventually disappear.

Recent Violence
In August, al-Sharq al-Awsat reported "intense armed presence and reciprocal military alerts between [the] Fatah movement and the Islamic Asbat al-Ansar." Whereas the complicated political landscape of Palestinian factions often led to internal violence in the past, Asbat al-Ansar has ratcheted tensions to levels previously unseen. The recent tensions initially arose over clashes between Fatah and the al-Dinniyah group, a little known faction supported by Asbat al-Ansar. To ease the situation, officials from the various factions concluded an agreement which stipulated "placing al-Dinniyah group under forced residence, under the custody of Asbat al-Ansar, as a prelude to working out a solution whereby they would be evicted from the camp."

Of more concern to Lebanon (and, by default, Syria) were al-Dinniyah's clashes with Lebanese forces in 2000. More recently, Badi Hamadah (aka Abu Obeida), a member of the group, was accused of killing three Lebanese military personnel in July 2002 when they tried to arrest him for other attacks. On the run, he sought refuge in Ein al-Hilweh. Though Asbat al-Ansar handed him over to Lebanese authorities on July 16, tensions lingered as violence continued. Following a spate of attacks in October, senior Ein al-Hilweh figures declared an "emergency situation." The attacks included bombings and shootings of Fatah, Lebanese, and UNRWA targets.

Asbat al-Ansar
Based almost entirely in Ein al-Hilweh, Asbat al-Ansar was among the first eleven international terror groups to have its assets frozen by President George W. Bush in his executive order of September 23, 2001. The group is also of serious concern to Lebanon and Syria. Led by Ahmad Abdul Karim as-Saadi (aka Abu Muhjin) since the early 1990s, the group justifies violence against civilians to achieve political ends -- namely, "overthrowing the Lebanese Government and thwarting perceived anti-Islamic influences in the country," according to State Department reports.

The State Department lists Asbat al-Ansar as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and notes that the group "probably receives money through international Sunni extremist networks and Bin Laden's al-Qaida network." Its cadres, numbering between 100 and 300, have reportedly fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir. On September 25, 2001, Asbat al-Ansar issued a statement denying its links to al-Qaeda while still praising Osama bin Laden, his words, and his deeds. Several months later, a Yemeni al-Qaeda emissary, Salah Hajir, met with the group's leaders.

In the early 1990s, Asbat al-Ansar bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores throughout Lebanon. In 1995, the group played a part in the assassination of Sheikh Nizar al-Halabi, former chairman of the "Islamic Charity Projects Society" and affiliated with al-Ahbash. In 1999, Lebanese officials reported clashes with guerrillas linked to Asbat al Ansar on the outskirts of Tripoli. Also in 1999, the group was behind an explosion at the Customs Department and a courthouse attack that killed four judges. In January 2000, the group attacked the Russian embassy in Beirut with rocket-propelled grenades. In 2001, a Jordanian official announced that Jordanian security forces, in conjunction with Lebanese forces, foiled an attack on the Jordanian, U.S., and British embassies in Lebanon by Asbat al-Ansar affiliates.

Policy Implications
Despite prodding by the Lebanese military to launch operations against insurgents inside Ein al-Hilweh, Syria refuses to order its forces into the camp for fear of sparking a wider Lebanese-Palestinian conflict. With this in mind, the U.S. government has asked Lebanese authorities only for information about the "movements and activities" of Abu Muhjin and other individuals linked to Asbat al-Ansar and al-Qaeda. But if Washington identified Asbat al-Ansar as an FTO with the goal of dismantling it, such requests are not sufficient. The United States must vigorously press Lebanon and Syria for more results.

For their part, Lebanon and Syria must address their dire refugee problem. Lebanese president Emile Lahoud recently rejected a "plan to demilitarize the camps, emphasizing that this issue is not urgent at the moment." But the situation is decidedly urgent, as indicated by the growing unrest that has resulted directly from poor conditions and reprehensible policymaking. Although Lebanon traditionally insists that the Palestinian refugee problem is an Israeli one, it has become a Lebanese problem in the absence of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Lebanon, Syria, and Fatah (the dominant faction) must therefore take steps to ballast Ein al-Hilweh. Failure to do so could destabilize Lebanon, exacerbate Lebanon's refugee crisis, and undermine U.S. efforts to combat international terror.

Jonathan Schanzer is a Soref fellow at the Washington Institute.

Militant Islam's New Strongholds
by Daniel Pipes and Jonathan Schanzer - New York Post - October 22, 2002

The recent bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, killing at least 183 and injuring hundreds, fits into a larger pattern. Militant Islam used to be mostly confined to Middle Easterners, but in recent years it has spread to Muslims in other parts of the world.

This can be seen especially in the cases of Indonesia, Bangladesh and Nigeria, three countries with a combined population of about 494 million inhabitants. Their Muslim population of some 378 million constitutes about a third of the global Muslim community.

Indonesia: This Southeast Asian country, 88 percent Muslim, hosts Islamist efforts to impose Islamic law (Shari'a) through both legal and violent means.

On the island of Aceh alone, more than 6,000 lives have been lost in fighting between the Islamist "Free Aceh Movement" and government forces. Asian intelligence sources believe this group may be an al Qaeda affiliate. The goal of these and other radicals, CNS News reports, is "to turn the world's most populous Muslim country into an extremist Islamic state by 2003." Muslim-Christian tensions have led to a full-blown religious war on other islands.

In Sulawesi, Islamists have deployed roadblocks, armored bulldozers and rocket launchers, thereby isolating the indigenous Christian community. They have also systematically targeted Christians, forcing them to convert, circumcising their children, burning churches and other buildings.

In all, Muslim-Christian clashes in Indonesia have killed more than 19,000 since 1999 and left over 600,000 displaced from their homes.

Bangladesh: Islamists in this 83 percent Muslim country of South Asia aspire to establish a true "Islamic Republic of Bangladesh" with a constitution based on the Shari'a. The goal, says the head of one group, is to "pursue a slow but steady policy towards Islamization of the country" - much like Afghanistan under the Taliban.

Not surprisingly, al Qaeda has tentacles in Bangladesh. "Harakat ul-Jihad Islami, Bangladesh" was reportedly established with direct aid from Osama bin Laden in 1992 and calls itself the "Bangladeshi Taliban." The group claimed responsibility for attacking U.S. government offices in Calcutta, killing five policemen in January 2002.

Since Sept. 11, thousands of al Qaeda supporters have taken to the streets of Dhaka after Friday prayers, touting posters that read: "Osama is our Hero," while burning effigies of President George W. Bush.

Meanwhile, members of minority religions have suffered from ghastly violence, including collective terror. The Nation reports that some Buddhists and Christians were blinded, had fingers cut off or had hands amputated, while "others had iron rods nailed through their legs or abdomen." Women and children have "been gang-raped, often in front of their fathers or husbands." In addition, hundreds of temples were desecrated and statues destroyed; thousands of homes and businesses looted or burned.

As for Hindus, the human rights organization Freedom House reports they have been subject to "rape, torture and killing and the destruction of their cultural and religious identity at the hands of Muslims." In one indicative step, Islamists sometimes force Hindu women to dress in the Islamist fashion.

Nigeria: Disregarding both the Nigerian constitution (which stipulates a separation of church and state) and demographic realities (only 50 percent of the population is Muslim), Islamists of this West African country have adopted or announced plans to adopt some version of Islamic law in 12 of its 36 states since 1999.

Implementing Islamic law means forbidding such practices as the construction of churches, music performances, the wearing of pants, drinking alcohol and riding in mixed-gender taxis. Forced conversions to Islam are reported, as well as coerced divorces of Muslim women from Christian men.

Vigilantes enforce Islamic law via punishments that include stoning, flogging and the chopping off of hands. Solidarity visits from Sudanese, Pakistani, Saudi, Palestinian and Syrian Islamists tie Nigeria to the wider forces of militant Islam. Freedom House concludes that Nigeria is undergoing a process of "Talibanization."


That militant Islam and its companion violence have spread from the Middle Eastern core to the periphery of the Muslim world is of great concern. It means that the enemies of the United States, moderate Islam, and of civilization itself are far more numerous and entrenched than previously thought. This implies that the current war will likely be longer, bloodier and more demanding than most people imagine.

By Jonathan Schanzer -POLICYWATCH #670 - October 21, 2002

Since September 2001, Yemen has worked hard to shed its image as a hotbed of Islamist terrorism. That image,
however, was reinforced when London's al-Sharq al-Awsat Arabic daily reported that the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA, or Aden-Abyan Islamic Army), an al-Qaeda affiliate, claimed responsibility for an explosion that crippled a French tanker
on October 6 in the Yemeni harbor of Mina' al-Dabba. Moreover, a recent letter allegedly written by Osama bin
Laden praises the "bold heroic jihad operations . . . against
the crusader's oil tanker." The attack, which killed one crewman, underscores Yemen's importance as an area of
concern in the U.S. government's "war on terror."

Background: IAA
The first attacks ever attributed to al-Qaeda took place at
two Yemeni hotels in 1992. IAA, however, did not emerge
until 1996 or 1997. Led by Zein al-Abidin al-Mihdar (aka Abu
al-Hassan), IAA asserted that Yemen's government was not implementing shari'a law properly. One communiqué
demanded that President Ali Abdullah Salih resign for this reason. Another threatened that if "ambassadors of America and Britain do not leave [Yemen] . . . the blow will be
painful." After the August 7, 1998, attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, IAA praised the
bombers as "heroes of the jihad."

Until late 1998, the group had only been linked to terrorist training camps, but on December 28 of that year, IAA kidnapped sixteen Western tourists in the region of Abyan. During the subsequent Yemeni rescue mission, four of the tourists (three Britons and one Australian) were killed, and
one American was wounded. At the end of the standoff,
Yemeni authorities captured several IAA cadres, including
Abu al-Hassan. The group subsequently warned that "if negotiations [to free Hassan] fail, all foreigners in Yemen
from Western ambassadors, experts and doctors to tourists have to leave Yemen. The Aden-Abyan Islamic Army will not
kidnap them but will kill them." Hassan was executed by Yemeni court order on October 17, 1999.

A string of bombings in 2001 was attributed to IAA, with
targets including a church and a hotel. In April 2001,
Hassan's successor, Hatem bin Fareed, was arrested and convicted of running the organization. Soon thereafter,
Yemeni officials insisted that IAA continued to exist "only
in the imagination of some people." In June 2001, however, authorities arrested IAA members plotting to bomb the U.S. embassy in San'a. The suspects were found with explosives, small arms, and a map of the embassy.

Al-Qaeda in Yemen
In 1999, al-Qaeda operatives, including IAA members, failed
in a plotto destroy a U.S. naval destroyer (USS The
Sullivans) off Yemen's coast. A year later, however, they
were more successful. On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole
was crippled by a powerful bomb while refueling in the
port of Aden. The attack killed seventeen U.S. sailors,
injured thirty-nine, and caused some $250 million in
damage. IAA issued a communiqué claiming responsibility, although two other groups also took credit.

The day after the Cole attack, a grenade was thrown at the British embassy in San'a. Although no group took credit, Yemeni authorities convicted an IAA member and three associates for their involvement. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Yemeni national Ramzi bin
al-Shibh was named as a potential suspect in the plot.
Some reports suggest that the original plan for those
attacks may have included al-Shibh leading a team in
hijacking a fifth plane and crashing it into the White House.

In August 2002, Yemeni authorities discovered 650 pounds
of explosives hidden among pomegranates in San'a after a wire-guided missile in the shipment accidentally exploded, killing two al-Qaeda operatives. Just last month, U.S.
officials dismantled an al-Qaeda cell of Yemeni nationals
just outside Buffalo, New York; authorities are now seeking
coconspirator Mamal Darwish, who is thought to be in

Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri
IAA is inextricably linked to Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, an
Egyptian-born cleric based in England whose funds were frozen by the U.S. government in 2001 due to his terrorist links. Accused by G7 ministers of being a "legal officer" for
IAA, al-Masri also sent members of his London-based organization, Ansar ash-Shari'a (Supporters of shari'a, or
SoS), to terrorist training camps run by IAA. Al-Masri
recruits have admitted to paying Abu al-Hassan for
weapons and training.

Al-Masri has described himself as a "media advisor" to IAA. Indeed, several IAA communiqués have been released by
him over the years. Abu al-Hassan was even said to have called al-Masri in London by satellite phone during the
hostage standoff of December 1998. Moreover, IAA's
claim of responsibility for the attack on the French tanker
was phoned into al-Sharq al-Awsat by SoS.

In 1999, British authorities arrested al-Masri for terrorism
links. They released him on bail, however, due to what the Times of London called "a loophole in the government's new anti-terrorist laws." Authorities have since banned him from preaching at his mosque, seized his passport, frozen his assets, and restricted his access to the media. The U.S. government is investigating al-Masri's terrorist ties as well,
and may request his extradition. Yemeni authorities have
also reportedly requested his extradition.

Yemen's Place in the Global War against Terror
Yemen's ties to terrorist groups have garnered increased attention since September 11, and, according to the State Department, U.S. officials have established "linkages
between the East Africa U.S. embassy bombings, the USS
Cole bombing, and the September 11 attacks."
Accordingly, the Yemeni government vowed to take a more active role in fighting terrorism. As part of this effort, Yemen allowed American Special Forces on its soil. According to a
U.S. military spokesman, a team of American troops is now "training, advising, and assisting" Yemeni forces. The
U.S. government is also believed to have given about $100 million to San'a to fight terror.

Yemen faces a serious problem with radical movements and tribal leaders, many of whom effectively rule remote and lawless parts of the country and are commonly viewed as outside the jurisdiction of Yemeni authorities. Affiliates of
bin Laden, whose ancestral roots lie in Yemen, have found asylum in such areas. In December 2001, a shootout
erupted between tribesmen and the military when Yemeni forces attempted to arrest three al-Qaeda suspects, leaving twenty dead and allowing the suspects to escape.

The difficulty of countering terrorism in Yemen is understandable. What is hard to accept is how Yemen dismisses its Islamist problem. For tendays, Yemeni
authorities vociferously denied that the French tanker
incident was an act of terrorism, claiming that it was an accident even before investigators determined the cause.
The government finally admitted that the incident was a terrorist attack on October 16. Such failures to face up to
the Islamist problem will only result in more attacks and
further embarrassment.

For its part, the U.S. government should focus increased
efforts on al-Qaeda affiliates, like IAA, that are responsible
for the bulk of the terrorism attributed to bin Laden's
network worldwide. For example, President George W.
Bush froze the assets of IAA in September of last
year, but the State Department has yet to list the group
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Such inconsistencies hinder both the U.S. counterterrorism effort in Yemen and
the broader war on terror.

Jonathan Schanzer is a Soref fellow at the Washington Institute.

Pre-emptive Or Presumptive ... Baghdad's In The Balance
By Daniel Pipes and Jonathan Schanzer - Australian Financial Review - August 24, 2002
(No URL available)

As US President George Bush prepares to depose Iraqi tyrant Saddam Hussein, American nay-sayers have emerged in opposition. Notably, Brent Scowcroft, a close colleague of Bush's father, counsels "don't attack Saddam" for fear that this would "undermine our anti-terror efforts". Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, however, did the right thing when he offered Australia's support for a prospective American military campaign. Here's why it's urgent to take this step.

* Record. Hussein has a history of aggression. He invaded Iran in 1980. He conquered Kuwait in 1990. He assaulted Saudi Arabia and Israel with missiles in 1991. He blew up the Kuwait oil fields later that year. He's shot at US and British aircraft in the no-fly zone since 1992. He attacked the Kurdish regional enclave in 1996.

He is also linked to terrorism. Iraq harbours Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the gang that bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. It also hosted the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal, just found dead in Baghdad. He encourages Hamas suicide bombers by paying $US10,000 ($18,500) to their families. His terrorists tried to assassinate former US President George Bush Snr and the Emir of Kuwait. An Iraqi diplomat met Al Qaeda's Mohammad Atta before the September 11 suicide mission.

* Casus belli. Hussein has a history of violating international law and developing illegal weapons. In February 1991, he signed an agreement accepting all UN Security Council resolutions passed after his invasion of Kuwait seven months earlier. He recognised Resolution 687, which demands Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) be "destroyed, removed or rendered harmless", and requires inspectors be allowed into Iraq.

But Hussein then played cat and mouse with the inspectors. "Iraq released detailed records of how many ballpoint pens it ordered in the late 1980s," notes a US Government report, but left out vital information about its "missile warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents".

Nonetheless, over seven years, inspectors did destroy at least 27,000 chemical weapons, 500 tonnes of mustard and nerve agents and thousands of tonnes of precursor chemicals. They dissembled much of Iraq's nuclear program, which had continued in violation of Resolution 687.

* Dangers. Hussein has unquestionably used the past four years to build WMD. Adnan Saeed al-Haideri, an Iraqi civil engineer and a recent defector, informed American intelligence that Hussein was building WMD in eight locations throughout Iraq.

Khidhir Hamza, former chief nuclear scientist for Hussein's nuclear weapons development program and another Iraqi defector, estimates Iraq now has "12 tonnes of uranium and 1.3 tonnes of low-enriched uranium", giving Hussein "three to five nuclear weapons by 2005".

Australian Richard Butler, former chief UN weapons inspector, says it is "foolish in the extreme" to believe that Hussein is not hard at work on WMD. If Hussein does get his hands on nuclear weapons, he will exploit them fully. He is the only ruler in power to have used WMD having deployed poison gases against both Iranians and his own Kurdish population.

Bush rightly states that the world must "confront the worst threats before they emerge". How can anyone recommend waiting until Iraq has nuclear weapons and uses them before defusing this problem?

The argument for pre-emption is compelling. Australia should support and join an American military campaign to oust Hussein.

Different Means, Same End Game
By Jonathan Schanzer - FrontPageMagazine.com - August 26, 2002

The videos repeatedly broadcast by CNN this week, including images of chemical weapons experiments on dogs, bomb-making demonstrations, and terrorist tactics, reaffirm the evil of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network, a hub for the 10-15% of Muslims worldwide who support the ideology of Islamism, or radical Islam.

However, not every Islamist group will choose to use weapons of mass destruction, make homemade explosives, or train to kill. Indeed, tactics vary greatly from one group to the next. Still, they have one thing in common: the desire for their radical, utopian and totalitarian interpretation of Islam to reign supreme in regimes around the world.

A brief survey of events this week reveals the range of less violent tactics employed by Islamists throughout the Muslim world to achieve the same ends:

Financing From Afar: A group of Americans grieving the loss of loved ones from the attacks of last fall just filed suit in Washington against three senior Saudi princes, several Saudi banks and "charities" for financing militant Islamic terror. They seek damages of over $1 trillion.

Why the Saudis? For years, allegations have circled that the Saudi Arabian royal family and elite has financed radical Islamic terror in their effort to spread the radical "Wahhabi" interpretation of Islam, and to appease the radicals that threaten to destabilize them at home.

Today, the Saudi government is thought to have ties to 19 fundraising groups that directly contribute to al Qaeda. The Saudi government was also one of only three governments to recognize the Taliban, which provided asylum and training bases for Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network to launch attacks on Americans.

Further, there is now incontrovertible evidence, found when Israel raided Yasir Arafat's compound in Ramallah, whereby the "Saudi Committee for Support of the Al-Quds Intifada," provided payment to relatives of Palestinian suicide bombers, singled out by the Saudis for their participation in an amaliah istish'hadiah, or "suicide operation."

Working Around The System: An Islamic court in northern Nigeria ruled on Monday that a woman must face death by stoning (according to Islamic law, or Shari'a) for having a child out of wedlock. Amina Lawal Kurami, 31, is now the second woman in Nigeria to be given the death penalty for such a "crime" since 2000.

In a clear violation of its constitution, which calls for a separation of church and state, 12 of Nigeria's 36 states have adopted or plan to adopt some version of Shari'a, thanks to pressure campaigns by local Islamists, with support from other Islamists abroad.

In many of these Islamized states, Islamist vigilantes patrol these states for violations of Islamic law — among Muslims and non-Muslims, alike. Infractions sometimes lead to verdicts based on the harsh Islamic "hudud" penalties, which include amputations, stonings and beheadings for varying crimes.

The result, according to Freedom House, a watchdog group, is a rash of internecine violence in Nigeria. An estimated 13,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1980. Most were hacked by swords and knives.

Working With The System: The Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) launched a public relations offensive against the government this week after King Abdullah's decision to postpone parliamentary elections (which would likely yield a significant Islamist victory) until spring 2003.

The group, according to the Jordan Times, linked the postponed elections with perceived danger that makes "Jordan as well as the whole region… targets for the US, which would occupy the region 'to impose its culture on the people, redraw the area's map...and enable the Zionist entity to control the whole region.'"

The group played the anti-America/anti-Israel card to undermine the government and further their Islamist agenda.

The IAF is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Jordan, and ranks among the most docile of the Islamist groups worldwide. As the largest opposition bloc in parliament, it works pragmatically (within the system, and without violence) in its efforts to Islamize Jordan.

By means of finance, vigilantes, or public relations, some Islamists seek to reach their goals without directly engaging in violence. But this makes them no less threatening.

While so-called "moderate" Islamists are tempered by their politics or other factors at home, the expansion of radical Islam continues to create instability worldwide.

Jonathan Schanzer is a research fellow for the Middle East Forum, a Philadelphia-based think tank.

The Roots of Palestinian Violence Revisited
By Jonathan Schanzer - GenerationJ.com - August 22, 2002

Twenty-two months after the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, or Palestinian War of independence, history has come full circle, exposing the roots of this violence.

Recently, Israeli Parliamentarian Michael Kleiner (Herut Party) visited the hotly contested religious site in Old City, Jerusalem revered by Jews as the site where their holy temple once stood, and by Muslims as the home of al-Aqsa Mosque, seen by some as the "third holiest site in Islam."

Kleiner, who wished to demonstrate that non-Muslims had a right to visit the site when they pleased, 1 is considered a hard-liner relative to other politicians in the Israeli spectrum. He belongs to the small but radical National Jewish Movement with the stated goals of preventing a Palestinian state, maintaining all of Jerusalem for Israelis, and even re-occupying parts of the disputed territories Israel has already ceded to the Palestinians. 2

Accordingly, when Kleiner visited the contested site, he was accompanied by religious demonstrators wielding posters imploring Israelis to "Free the Temple Mount." Others wore T-shirts proclaiming that "The Temple Mount is for the Jews, Mecca is for the Arabs." 3

The next day, the Jerusalem Post reported a half-hearted demonstration of a mere two dozen Peace Now supporters (Israelis), toting signs that read "Sharon and Kleiner: A twin disaster." Meanwhile, Arab passers-by simply watched. 4

Surprisingly, there was hardly a word about the visit in the Arab press. Just al-Quds Newspaper, an official Palestinian Authority mouthpiece, filed an infinitesimal, four-line report with a headline that read: "The Police Prevents Followers of Kleiner From Entering Al-Aqsa." The last line of the report noted that, "in another matter, the police allowed Knesset member Kleiner to approach the western gate without allowing him to enter the al-Aqsa courtyard." 5

In other words, Kleiner's visit elicited a yawn from the Arab world.

Interestingly, nearly two years ago, on September 28, 2000, then-Likud party leader Ariel Sharon toured the same area with a radically different outcome.

A secular nationalist, Sharon's visit held almost no religious significance. There were no zealots, signs or t-shirts, just a sizeable entourage for his own personal security.

The Palestinians, however, claimed that Sharon's visit somehow started this current Intifada, which has since left more than 1,490 Palestinians and 585 Israelis dead. 6 They claim that he "pushed" the Palestinians to violence, including rock-throwing, Molotov cocktail-launching, sniping at civilians, laying mines and suicide bombings, that continues to this day.

After Sharon's visit, the Palestinian and Arab world press was deluged with invective. Speaker of the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC) Ahmed Qurei said his visit was a "clear expression of the Israeli designs to eliminate the Islamic and Arab features of the Temple Mount." 7 Dozens of other figures echoed his sentiments.

So, what do these similar visits with dissimilar outcomes say about the ongoing violence?

It says that these 22 months of terror are not the result of spontaneous Palestinian anger, or defense against Israel "aggressions," as Palestinians would have the world believe. The disparate outcomes of the visits by Kleiner and Sharon show that this war was a choice, a deliberate Palestinian military decision.

This was verified by Imad Faluji, a member of the Palestinian Authority, and minister of post and telecommunications, who was quoted as saying that the violence was "planned since Chairman [Yasir] Arafat's return from Camp David" when those talks failed in July 2000. 8

The talks failed when the Palestinians rejected a U.S. brokered peace plan granting their people more than 97% of their territorial goals. As it turns out, the Palestinians had other plans.

Earlier that year, in May 2000, Hizbullah, a radical Islamic group funded by Syria and Iran, had just succeeded in forcing the Israelis to withdrawal from Lebanon's south after nearly 20 years of a brutal guerrilla war. In an attempt to emulate their neighbors to the north, Hizbullah, the Palestinians opted to reject diplomacy and choose violence. In other words, Yasir Arafat and company used Sharon's visit as a convenient pretext to launch a guerrilla war that continues to this day.

Kleiner's recent visit is yet another stark reminder that Sharon's visit was merely a pretext for Palestinian aggression. The violence was—and still —a tactic employed in the hopes of exacting Israeli concessions through murder, rather than diplomacy at the negotiating table.

[1] Etgar Lefkovitz, "MK Kleiner visits Temple Mount," Jerusalem Post, August 9, 2002,
[2] See http://www.herut.org.il/english/
[3] Etgar Lefkovitz, "MK Kleiner visits Temple Mount," Jerusalem Post, August 9, 2002,
[4] Etgar Lefkovitz, "MK Kleiner visits Temple Mount," Jerusalem Post, August 9, 2002,
[5] http://www.alquds.com/today/front/news6.html (my translation).
[6] Jeffrey Heller ,"Palestinians Say Sharon Out to Undermine U.S. Talks," Reuters, August 9, 2002.
[7] "Palestinian Speaker Decries Sharon's Visit to Temple Mount," People¹s Daily, September 29, 2000.
[8] David Schenker, "The State Department's Annual Terrorism Report: Politics as Usual," PeaceWatch, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Number 322, May 1, 2001.

By DANIEL PIPES & JONATHAN SCHANZER - New York Post - August 20, 2002

CONSIDER the paradox: Almost every government agrees that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is an appalling monster and shudders at the prospect of his acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet those same governments are also furiously signaling their disapproval of an American-led military effort to depose him.

That would be "risky adventurism," declares Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder; Saddam poses no immediate threat, and Washington lacks a justification to attack him. Most U.S. allies worldwide agree.

But they are plain wrong. Saddam is an immediate menace, and the U.S. government has cause to preempt him. Here's why:

* Record. Saddam has a history of unrelenting aggression. He invaded Iran in 1980. He conquered Kuwait in 1990. He assaulted Saudi Arabia and Israel with missiles in 1991. He's shot at U.S. and British aircraft in the "no-fly zone" since 1992. He attacked the Kurdish regional enclave in 1996.

He also has many links to terrorism. Iraq harbors Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the gang that bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. It also hosted the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal, just found dead in Baghdad. He encourages Hamas suicide bombers by paying $10,000 to their families. His terrorists tried to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush and the emir of Kuwait. An Iraqi diplomat met with al Qaeda's Mohammad Atta before the Sept. 11 suicide mission.

* Casus belli. Saddam has a history of violating international law and developing illegal weapons.

In February 1991, he signed an agreement accepting all U.N. Security Council resolutions passed after his invasion of Kuwait seven months earlier. He recognized Resolution 687, which demands Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) be "destroyed, removed or rendered harmless," and requires inspectors be allowed into Iraq.

But Saddam then played "cat and mouse" with the inspectors by withholding information, dissimulating and hiding materiel. "Iraq released detailed records of how many ballpoint pens it ordered in the late 1980s," noted a U.S. government report in 1998, but left out vital information about its "missile warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents."

Nonetheless, over seven years, inspectors did destroy at least 27,000 chemical bombs, artillery shells and rockets, 500 tons of mustard and nerve agents and thousands of tons of precursor chemicals. They dissembled much of Iraq's nuclear program, which was further along than previously thought - and which had continued in violation of Resolution 687.

Then, in August 1998, Saddam accurately read the Clinton administration's mood and closed the door to further inspections, correctly figuring he would not have to pay a price for this unilateral abrogation of his promises.

* Dangers. Saddam has unquestionably used the past four years to build WMD. Adnan Saeed al-Haideri, an Iraqi civil engineer and a recent defector, informed the Defense Intelligence Agency that Saddam is building biological and chemical weapons in eight locations throughout Iraq. Khidhir Hamza, former chief nuclear scientist for Saddam's nuclear weapons development program and another Iraqi defector, estimates Iraq now has "12 tons of uranium and 1.3 tons of low-enriched uranium" and asserts that Saddam will have "three to five nuclear weapons by 2005."

Richard Butler, former chief U.N. weapons inspector, says it is "foolish in the extreme" to believe that Saddam is not hard at work on long-range missiles, and nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry. If Saddam does get his hands on nuclear weapons, he will exploit them fully. He is the only ruler in power already to have used WMD - having deployed poison gases against both Iranians and his own Kurdish population.

President Bush is therefore right to state that the United States must "confront the worst threats before they emerge." With no other means to dismantle Saddam's arsenal and protect against future aggression, this leaves a military campaign as the only option - and the sooner it begins, the better for us all.

Militant Islam’s Burgeoning Borders
By Jonathan Schanzer - FrontPageMagazine.com - August 20, 2002

Once a primarily Middle East phenomenon, militant Islam has become a world epidemic. As allied troops fight to rid Afghanistan, Yemen, Georgia and the Philippines of its radical Islamic elements, new movements gain strength elsewhere around the globe. Today, its roots are growing in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Nigeria, proving that hard work lies ahead, if militant Islam’s burgeoning borders are ever to be contained.

With a teeming population of 126 million, Nigeria is struggling to stabilize both politically and economically. Recently, instability has been made worse by religious tensions between Christians (40%) and Muslims (50%). An estimated 13,000 Nigerians have been killed in internecine violence since 1980. Most were hacked by swords and knives.

The problem stems from militant Muslims that have attempted to impose Shari’a in several states in recent years. Since 1999, 12 of Nigeria’s 36 states have adopted or plan to adopt some version of Shari’a. These developments prompted Freedom House, a watchdog group, to note that Nigeria is exhibiting symptoms of “Talibanization.”

It began on August 25, 1999, when Zamfara state announced its adoption of Shari’a after a successful campaign by fundamentalist Muslims.Indeed, Islamism was a popular alternative among those opposed to the largely corrupt national government.

Other states have since followed suit, enforcing restrictions that include a moratorium on new churches, performing music, wearing pants, drinking alcohol and riding in co-ed taxis. Forced conversions have been reported, as well as forced divorces in Muslim-Christian intermarriages. Punishments for varying crimes include stoning, flogging, and chopping off hands.

Meanwhile, President Obasanjo won’t take steps to halt these “injustices lest he further upset Muslim officers” in the military that could pose a threat to his authority. To put it another way, he has forfeited his authority to violent vigilante groups patrolling these newly Islamized states, illegally enforcing Shari’a. These groups burn churches, loot government offices, and destroy cars and homes.

More worrisome, perhaps, is that Nigeria has become a staging ground for the forces of militant Islam in their efforts to expand worldwide. Some states, for example, have received solidarity visits from Sudanese, Pakistani, Saudi, Palestinian and Syrian Islamists. Further, Usama bin Laden has become a hero among many Nigerian Muslims who have taken to the streets with anti-American sentiment on numerous occasions.

“The entire Moslem Ummah in Nigeria has come or is coming about the Shari’a bandwagon,” writes one concerned Nigerian newspaper publisher. “How this is handled by Moslems and Christians will now determine the future of Nigeria.”

Indonesia is the most populated Muslim country in the world. With a population of 228 million, 88% (more than 190 million) are said to be Muslim, while only 12% are Protestant, Catholic, Hindu or Buddhist.

After the country experienced major economic troubles in 1997, and then political upheaval in 1999, Indonesia became fertile ground for the spread of militant Islam. Mainstream Islamist groups have since emerged with increased popularity, including the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama, with perhaps 40 million members, and the modernist Muhammadiyah, with 28 million. In the 1999 elections, Islamists took 86 of a possible 462 seats, and will likely take more in 2004.

But what is not accomplished through legal channels is sought through violence. In their campaign to institute Shari’a, Islamists have systematically targeted Christians, forcing them to convert, forcibly circumcising children, and burning churches. Other violence includes raids on gambling halls and shops selling alcohol. At one estimate, vigilante attacks have taken the lives of more than 10,000 Christians since January 1999, leaving more than 300,000 displaced.

In the first three months of 1999, more than 1,000 people in the Maluku Islands there were killed in internecine violence. In April of this year, radical groups threatened to deploy 10,000 volunteers to “liberate” that area of Christians, and create a pure Islamic region. Muslim-Christian tensions have since led to a full-blown religious war. In the last two years, 9,000 deaths have been reported in the Malukus alone.

Meanwhile, on the Sulawesi islands, armed with rocket launchers and automatic weapons, radicals set up roadblocks, plastered the walls with bin Laden posters, and have isolated the Christian community, numbering 60,000 or more. Last December, the government brokered a pact, but violence flared again in August 2002,with five Christians killed, and hundreds of Christian homes burned to the ground. Indonesian intelligence now believes that the radicals there are likely funded by al-Qa’ida.

Perhaps the highest profile area of conflict, however, is Aceh, which has seen decades of conflict between Islamist separatists and government forces. In the last decade, more than 6,000 people have been killed in fighting between the Free Aceh Movement and government forces. In January 2001, Indonesia finally granted Aceh autonomy to enforce Shari’a law, a move seen as placating the separatists. Since then, Aceh’s government has destroyed churches and forbade the practice of Christianity.

Asian intelligence sources have since asserted that the Free Aceh Movement works with al-Qa’ida, and that al-Qa’ida even considered moving to Aceh after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom. Bin Laden's lieutenant, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, reportedly visited Aceh in June 2000.

Another group with links to al-Qa’ida and Usama bin Laden is the 10,000-strong Lashkar Jihad (Jihad Army) founded in April 2000, and led by Jaffar Umar Thalib, who recently ordered every “jihad soldier” in Indonesia to “write out their wills” and “welcome their fate as martyrs.” In a separate interview after September 11, Thalib said, “Allah be praised, the Muslims continue their jihad against America, and it is our obligation to support them as best we can.”

According to one analyst, the goal of Thalib and other Islamists in Indonesia is “to turn the world’s most populous Muslim country into an extremist Islamic state by 2003.” While next year is an exaggerated projection, there is no question that militant Islam is rapidly gaining ground.

Bangladesh is roughly the size of Illinois, but has an estimated 131 million citizens – or half the population of the U.S. Plagued by political and economic instability, Bangladesh is also prime turf for the spread of militant Islam.

According to one report, the major problem stems from radical Islamists’ “dissatisfaction with the ‘pseudo-Islamization’ of the country and want it to be renamed the “Islamic Republic of Bangladesh” ruled by Shari’a.”

The result has been violence, prompted by Islamist groups like Jama’at-a Islami, against Christians for about a decade. Examples are many. In 1995, a Catholic school was burned down by Islamists. In 1998, Muslims took to the streets, attacking churches and other Christian property. In one like case, a 13-year old Christian girl was raped and had to face up to her “crime” or produce four Muslim witnesses for her defense.

Buddhists and Hindus have also been “subject to a systematic policy of rape, torture and killing, and the destruction of their cultural and religious identity at the hands of Muslims,” according to one report. Hindu women have reportedly been forced to dress like Muslims; their traditional garb has been forbidden.

One writer notes that Buddhists and Christians are “terrorized collectively… hundreds of temples desecrated and statues destroyed; thousands of homes and businesses looted or burned… One man’s fingers had been cut off, another’s hand was amputated, still more were blinded and others had iron rods nailed through their legs or abdomen…women and children who had been gang-raped, often in front of their fathers or husbands.”

Not surprisingly, al-Qa’ida has “tentacles” in Bangladesh.” The largest satellite (15,000 cadres) is Harakat ul-Jehad-i Islami, Bangladesh (HUJI-BD), which was established with direct aid from Usama bin Laden in 1992. Trained in the camps of Afghanistan, HUJI-BD calls itself the “Bangladeshi Taliban.” The group made headlines when its leader Fazlur Rahman signed al-Qa’ida’s declaration of jihad against the U.S. in 1998. HUJI-BD plotted to kill Bangladeshi poet Shamsur Rahman in January 1999, and then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2000.

Since September 11, anti-American and pro-al-Qa’ida sentiment has soared. More than 10,000 Islamists took to the streets of Dhaka after Friday prayers in September, protesting the allied actions in Afghanistan. In other demonstrations, Islamists touted posters saying “Bush: Enemy of Mankind” and “Usama is our Hero,” burning effigies of U.S. President George W. Bush. They chanted, “We are with Laden, we will fight the U.S.” One prominent Islamist stated, “America and Bush must be destroyed. The Americans will be washed away if Bangladesh’s 120 million Muslims spit on them.”

On January 22, 2002, the Bangladeshi faction of Harakat-ul-Jehad-i Islami attacked the U.S. cultural center in Calcutta, India, killing five guards and wounding 20. Six people were detained from the attack, including three madrasa teachers.

The head of Jamaat-i-Islami, notes that the goal is to “pursue a slow but steady policy towards Islamization of the country.” This goal may be attainable, given there are an estimated 64,000 madrasas in Bangladesh (most of which teach radicalism), that one civil servant calls “a ticking time bomb.”

This dangerous combination of factors, notes one analyst, is that “economic collapse and political crisis can galvanize support for extremists very quickly… Bangladesh could deteriorate and become a new nest for terror.”

What to Do?
According to Dr. Ajai Sahni, director of India’s Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), Bangladesh is an area of “potential” rather than “imminent” threat. The same can be said for Nigeria and Indonesia.

It is clear, then, that militant Islam continues to proliferate around the globe. And while the solution to this growing world epidemic is not clear, steps should be taken.

First, the U.S. government must acknowledge that militant Islam (not simply “terror”) is a problem of global, and epidemic proportions. Indeed, this dangerous ideology has already spread from the Middle East to southeast and central Asia, as well as West Africa. To properly combat the problem, the Pentagon, State Department and executive branch must resolve to stop its growth. Reluctance to identify militant Islam, as such, will only postpone policies designed to directly tackle the problem.

Second, rather than waiting for the “potential” threat to become “imminent,” the United States should act quickly to neutralize the dangers posed. The right steps must be taken now. This includes closer cooperation with these governments, anti-terror assistance, increased financial aid, and closer surveillance as a means to identify and offset these dangerous developments before military intervention becomes a necessity.

Government mouthpieces harp on the importance of top-secret intelligence intercepts as the key to preventing future militant Islamic attacks. Top U.S. military brass, meanwhile, focuses on dismantling the militant Islamic infrastructure already in place. More emphasis, however, must be placed on the prevention of future radicalism around the globe, as a means to preempt future attacks. Such a strategy might even prevent future battle theaters in America’s war on terror.

Palestinian Uprisings Compared
by Jonathan Schanzer - Middle East Quarterly - Summer 2002 (Vol. IX, No.3)

History, it is said, does not repeat itself, or revisits tragedy as farce. This is not so in the Palestinian case, where tragedy has been followed by tragedy. A critical look at modern Palestinian history reveals that the current crisis, driven by the so-called "Al-Aqsa intifada," fits a recurring Palestinian pattern of miscalculation, fratricide, religious radicalism, economic despair, and self-destruction. By comparing the recent violence with Palestinian uprisings in the 1930s and the 1980s, and now, a clear pattern can be discerned. This is the third time in seventy years the Palestinians have orchestrated a nationalist uprising, and the third time it has led them to disaster.

Patterns of the Past

In 1990, Emory University professor Kenneth Stein published a much-cited study comparing the 1987 intifada with the 1936 Arab revolt.1 His work is a useful point of departure for any comparative study of political violence in Palestinian history.

Indeed, Stein found remarkable similarities between the two uprisings. Further, many of his observations can be applied to the current uprising:

Over the last several years [he wrote in 1990], Palestinian Arabs engaged in civil disobedience and political violence in different parts of the holy land … A political stalemate was impending, while Jewish presence continued to envelop Palestinians … Religiously, the shared disillusionment among many Palestinian Muslims infused an Islamic component into the ardor … The religious philosophy that was posited included a pronounced rejection of the West, the adoption of a militant course of political action through armed struggle, and a keen desire to expel the influence and presence of the great power and the Jewish invaders … Disagreements within the current Palestinian leadership existed over difference in strategies and tactics … Among the most strident Palestinian nationalists there was a concern that more moderate Palestinian leaders might accept a settlement that was sponsored by the great power … A perception existed that the Palestinian Arabs could not be trusted as equals in the future administration of Palestine or portions of it.2
Most of Stein's observations still hold true today. There are striking similarities across all three uprisings. But while his work addresses some of the detrimental effects that the two uprisings had on the Palestinian nationalist movement, he neglects to note the clear self-destructive pattern that emerged out of the first two uprisings and that is still salient today.

I. The Arab Revolt, 1936-39

From 1936 to 1939, Palestinian Arabs rose against the colonial British and the Jewish community (Yishuv) in protest against the increase of Jewish immigration to the British mandate of Palestine. In the name of independence, they staged strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations. Thousands left their jobs, and scores of businesses were shut down. As a result, the Arab economy was devastated.

But the economic cost was only the beginning. Spiraling violence left 5,000 Palestinians dead, 15,000 wounded, and 5,600 incarcerated.3 Coordinating much of the violence was the mufti of Palestine and head of the Higher Arab Committee, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. He regarded violence as the most effective answer to Jewish immigration and British imperial rule. As the uprising continued, a rift developed between Husayni's radical faction and the moderate Nashishibi family,4 which sought a diplomatic solution that would partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. This was unacceptable to the Husayni clan; they launched a campaign of intimidation and murder against moderate Arab mayors and officials who opposed them.

The result was a civil war for the very soul of the Palestinian people. Writes historian Yehoshua Porath, "a terrible blood feud between two Palestinian camps … resulted in a mutual hatred and dissidence so intense that a return to the show of unity … became impossible."5 In fact, the Husayni-Nashishibi rift sparked the beginning of a trend recognizable today as collaborator killings. As a result of this civil feud, write political scientists Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, "rebels abducted a sizeable number of village chiefs—mukhtars, who were on the British payroll. They also assassinated others suspected of collaboration or against whom grudges were held, creating all sorts of new grievances on the part of their kin."6

"Organized Arab resistance had collapsed by early 1939," writes historian Charles Smith, "reduced to acts of retribution against other Arabs considered to be traitors."7 Indeed, as Palestinian society deteriorated into a state of lawlessness, some Palestinians used collaboration charges as a way of exacting revenge in old vendettas. Collaboration killings accounted for 494 deaths,8 or about 10 percent of all Palestinians killed during the Arab "revolt."

The situation deteriorated further as Palestinians recruited young children—below conscription age—to fight for their cause. Youth units, known simply as shabab, were formed to enforce compliance with Husayni's policies and to prevent moderates from "collaborating" with the enemy. Husayni, however, took things a step further in forming "youth troops" fashioned after the Hitler Youth in Germany. As Kimmerling and Migdal point out, "Palestinians had the young, brown- and black-shirted fascists to emulate."9 This disregard for the lives of children was yet another indication of how the first uprising tore at Palestinian society.

The uprising also prompted Islamic radicalism. For example, Christian women were forced to veil themselves with a hijab in many cities during the revolt, as ordered by Husayni. But Christians and Druze also endured much worse. In 1936, Muslim radicals called for a boycott of the Palestinian Christians for allegedly undermining the revolt. Further, Christians and Druze faced regular and organized attacks by Muslim radicals.10

The influence of Islamic radicalism ran deep. In early 1935, radical Palestinian cleric ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam organized guerrilla units in northern Arab villages to attack the British. He was instantly regarded as an important symbol in the Palestinian uprising. Ironically, his first squads of holy warriors were largely ineffectual on the battlefield, and the British killed Qassam that same year. Still, he was responsible for a new trend in Palestinian history: the resort to organized terror and guerrilla tactics. After Qassam's death, his legacy lived on. The fighting shifted to the countryside, where thousands of paramilitary fighters mined roads and battled against British and Jewish personnel.

But Qassam's legacy extended well beyond the Arab revolt. Qassam's influence, write Kimmerling and Migdal, "extend[ed] to the concerted attack by the fedayeenon the state of Israel after 1948."11 To take their assertion a step further, it can be argued that Qassam's guerrilla fighters set the precedent for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Qassam's mujahideen, however, were not the only guerrillas to emerge in the Arab revolt. Dozens of fighter groups emerged as the uprising dragged on, directed by mutually suspicious leaders, further reflecting the fragmentation of Palestinian society. That there was never a clearly delineated leadership meant that Palestinian fighting forces were decentralized and thus largely ineffectual. These numerous rural fighting bands often battled each other, leaving the Palestinian paramilitary in a state of disarray and vulnerable to the more organized Jewish and British militaries. Their defeat was a foregone conclusion.

In the final balance, the first uprising was deeply damaging to the Palestinian cause. First, the uprising caused the Zionists to rethink their long-term strategy and prepare for military struggle against the Arabs rather than the British. The shift was instrumental to their ultimate victory against the Arabs in the 1948 war.12

Second, the uprising alienated the British from the Palestinians. The Arab "revolt" had the British, who held the fate of Palestine in their hands, seeing red. In their subsequent campaign to quash all Palestinian violence, the British banned most political parties, restricted the press, incarcerated radicals, and deported Palestinian leaders. This campaign effectively dismantled Palestinian civil society, which took decades to rebuild. Indeed, it can be argued that Palestinian civil society never recovered.

Finally, while the Zionists fought for their independence against the British following World War II, one Palestinian notes that his people "proved too exhausted by the efforts of rebellion between 1936 and 1939 to be in any condition to match [them]."13 This vacuum encouraged surrounding Arab countries to intervene on the Palestinians' behalf, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq, in order to represent the impotent Palestinian population during and after World War II.14Unfortunately for the Palestinians, these Arab governments were motivated by self-interest, and their designs on Palestine only contributed to the Palestinian nakba, or disaster, that ensued. The cause of Palestine was championed by those who rejected the 1947 United Nations General Assembly partition plan, which would have endowed the Palestinians with a state in an expanded Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and much of the northern territory. It was all lost when the invading Arab armies failed to crush the new state of Israel. Egypt and Transjordan occupied what was left of mandatory Palestine, leaving the Palestinians without a state of their own.

II. Intifada, 1987-93

The intifada, or "shaking off," began in 1987 as a response to a feeling of helplessness among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli rule since 1967. With a renewed sense of purpose, Palestinians felt encouraged by the initial solidarity between the territories and their exiled leadership in Tunisia.

The Israelis attempted to quell the uprising via economic sanctions. Many Palestinians living in the territories were banned from entering Israel where they had earned their livelihood. In May 1989, all citrus imports from Gaza to Israel were cut off—a move described by the Citrus Union Association as a "noose around the Gaza Strip's neck."15

But Israel was not the only country to come down hard on the Palestinians. With the rise of the intifada, anti-Jordanian sentiment also rose. As a direct result, Jordan's King Husayn retaliated in 1988 by dropping Jordan's claims to the West Bank, leaving it to its own destiny. This was particularly damaging since between 1980 and 1988, the king had invested millions of dollars into the West Bank economy, including funds for religious foundations, clinics, schools, and other social services. For four decades, West Bankers had been considered Jordanian subjects, complete with Jordanian passports and rights to vote. Now, those rights were gone.

However, as was the case in the 1930s, economic problems were just the beginning. Intra-Palestinian rivalries soon reemerged, and paranoia swept the territories, leading to an epidemic of violence. As political scientistDon Peretz writes, "Although the PLO and the UNLU [United National Leadership of the Uprising] in the territories adopted a calculated policy refraining from the use of arms against Israelis, this did not apply to collaborators."16 About one-fifth of the 730 attacks during the first four months of the intifada were the result of intra-Palestinian violence.17

Fittingly, one writer noted the emergence of an "intrafada."18 While much of the killing was politically motivated, writes terrorism expertBard O'Neill, "a good deal of the violence [had] little or nothing to do with collaborators and much to do with local feuds and blood debts."19 In the end, Palestinian radicals killed at least 800 of their own for supposedly providing Israel with intelligence.20 In several cases, collaborators were lynched or assassinated.

Perhaps the most infamous lynching was the one that took place in the West Bank village of Qabatiya. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari describe it:
After surrounding the house for hours, during which the victim's desperate calls for help went unanswered, the people of Kabatiya broke into it, stabbed and beat the man to death, and strung his corpse up from an electricity pole as a gruesome warning to others of his kind.21
Not all suspected collaborators were killed, however. Some collaborators woke up in the morning to find coffins standing under their windows.22 Some got off easy by taking an oath of contrition on the Qur'an or the Bible in a mosque.23 Hundreds of other suspects were brought to "trial," where they confessed, relinquished their weapons, and asked for forgiveness over mosque loudspeakers. Those who refused to admit collaboration might have their houses burned.24

This violence was in no small way exacerbated by the popular emergence of Islamism, of the extreme sort pioneered by ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam a half-century earlier. When the uprising began, many Palestinians saw fundamentalist Islam as a way to mobilize popular discontent against Israel. The Islamists refused to negotiate with Israel, opting instead to wage jihad or "holy war." The best-known Palestinian manifestation of this ideology came in the form of Hamas.

An offshoot of the Muslim Brethren, Hamas offered a popular alternative to secular rule. The group published its own covenant in August 1988, intended to offset the influence of the secular PLO charter. The emergence of their radicalized ideology, and the subsequent debate over the religious future of Palestine, prompted Islamists to violence against secular Palestinians and against Israeli civilian and military targets. It is no coincidence that Hamas's military wing was named the "‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades," after the original Palestinian jihad warrior of the 1930s.

As the popularity of Islamism rose in the territories, Islamists often vandalized liquor stores, movie theaters, and video stores. They also carried out attacks against women whom they perceived as immodestly dressed, as well as weddings that allowed Western music and dancing.25 The Palestinian Christian population once again suffered. And while some historians argue that Christians willingly joined the orchestrated violence and strikes of the intifada, the more convincing argument is that their involvement was the response of a frightened minority accommodating itself to an increasingly hostile environment.26

As the intifada continued, another familiar trend emerged: children used as soldiers. "Children of the Stones," they were often called,27 with innumerable poems written to glorify their deaths. Both Islamists and secularists encouraged thousands of young Palestinian children to fight Israeli soldiers on the front lines. Children were assigned tasks according to their age. According to Palestinian journalist Da'ud Kuttab,
the youngest group was between ages 7 and 10, entrusted with the task of rolling tires into roads, pouring gasoline on them, and setting them afire … The 11 to 14-year-olds place large rocks in the roads to block traffic. Many in this group have become skilled at making and using homemade slingshots to fire stones at [Israel Defense Force soldiers]. The 15 to 19-year-olds are the "veteran stone throwers" who inflict the most damage on passing cars.28
Palestinian children were often put in very dangerous positions, writes Israeli journalist Makram Khuri Makhul:
The order was that the youngsters should go in the front, facing the fire, and they don't hesitate to do so. They block the army's central route … Once, in order to start a demonstration, [they] would send the children to organize the disturbance.29
Don Peretz writes:
Whereas parents used to be protective of school-age youths and apprehensive about their participation in political demonstrations and activity, many now support and even encourage their children to become involved. … To be the parent of a young man or woman who has become a martyr in the struggle against the occupation, though tragic, is a source of pride, a badge of communal honor. Such parents, rather than traditional leaders, are often chosen to be members of the local committees that organize the intifada at the grassroots level.30
Accordingly, of the estimated 1,100 Palestinians killed in the second uprising, more than 250 were children.31 One study puts their average age at ten.32 Another study estimates that children were responsible for as much as 85 percent of the incidents during the intifada's first two years.33

But the real cost of the intifada would only become evident later, after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), pursuant to the Oslo accords in 1993. Not only did the uprising fail to prepare the Palestinians for statehood. It left behind a culture of violence that militated against the success of state building. In particular, it celebrated each man's (and woman's) right to strike out violently in anger or revenge—not just against Israel, but against Palestinian dissenters and moderates. Within a decade, intra-Palestinian violence returned with a vengeance.

III. Intifada II, 2000-Present

The Al-Aqsa intifada erupted in September 2000. The seeds were sown in May 2000, when Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon after sustaining years of heavy casualties in a conflict with the Iranian-backed Hizbullah guerrilla group. This was the first time in history that Israel withdrew from conflict with an Arab foe. This retreat emboldened the Palestinians, who flatly rejected the Camp David II peace plan—Israel's historic offer of a Palestinian state in nearly all the territory of the West Bank and Gaza. In all likelihood, Palestinian Authority chairman Yasir Arafat reasoned that if the Lebanese could force an Israeli withdrawal without negotiations, so could he. Thus began the "Lebanonization" of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.34 Within weeks, the Palestinians launched a unilateral war of attrition with ill-defined aims. The scenario is sadly familiar.

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society puts the total number of Palestinian deaths in the West Bank and Gaza since September 29, 2000, and through April 15, 2002, at 1,427, with more than 18,977 injured.35 One year into this uprising, approximately 161 children were killed and some 6,000 injured.36This, according to one study, constitutes a 27-percent increase in the rate of child deaths from the previous uprising.37

That nearly all of these children were on the front lines of the conflict and encouraged to fight by their families and the PA-owned media should come as no surprise. After all, the PA for several years has been training its youngsters in the use of automatic rifles and other military-style weaponry.38 Additionally, in the first months of the uprising, families were offered incentives of $2,000 per child killed and $1,000 for each child wounded.39

The killing of "collaborators" also reemerged. According to one report, "families are exerting a more powerful influence than ever before in solving feuds, whether through vigilante killings or the judgments of the clan's leader." Further, "diplomats, aid workers, and families have noted two major feuds between families in the northern and southern Gaza Strip in which several people died."40

Indeed, scores of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have been killed or injured by vigilantes since the uprising began.41 One particularly gruesome and recent event involved the killing of three men who had just been convicted by a Palestinian military court when Palestinian gunmen killed them and then threw their bodies out into the street. The three defendants had been found guilty of killing a member of the Palestinian security forces; the attack was thought to be a revenge killing carried out by members of his clan. Ironically, during the Palestinians' first intifada, one victim had himself killed several suspected collaborators with Israel.42

One journalist writes, "as collaboration fever spread across the West Bank and Gaza, many paramilitaries used it as an excuse to settle scores. One man was nearly killed for a debt of $250."43 Other killings were the product of political disagreements and love triangles. The result says Bassem Eid, director of Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, is "a witch hunt,"44 resulting in "a huge social crisis."45

Religious zealots and ultra-nationalist radicals have exacerbated the crisis. According to Palestinian analyst Mahdi ‘Abd al-Hadi, this uprising has produced a "new, unknown, faceless generation of leaders, and nobody knows where they are going."46These leaders hail from radical groups including the Tanzim, Palestinian Hizbullah, Al-Aqsa Brigades, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

According to Khalil Shiqaqi, the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, a Palestinian civil war is now underway. Young zealots have effectively hijacked the intifada and are now exploiting Palestinian instability "to weaken the Palestinian old guard and eventually displace it."47 This young guard, according to Shiqaqi, "has assumed de facto control over most PA civil institutions [and] penetrated PA security services."48 They have chosen "not to create new national institutions but rather to work for control of the existing ones."49

They are steadily reaching their goals. Support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad today is said to be higher than ever, with polls showing nearly 31 percent popularity in the West Bank and Gaza.50 The radical Tanzim, under the leadership of Marwan Barghuti (now in Israeli custody), has repeatedly ordered Palestinians to ignore calls for cease-fires with Israel—and the Tanzim hails from the Fatah party, a faction under the leadership of Arafat himself.

In November 2000, an unprecedented 3,000 protestors clashed with PA police over the arrest of Mahmud Tawalbi, a leader of the Islamic Jihad. More recently, in February 2002, Palestinian police clashed with more than 200 demonstrators at a jail in Hebron, where sixty members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad were set free. Similar clashes are regularly reported, prompting one Israeli intelligence official to predict that PA rule in the Gaza Strip "will disintegrate and that … Arafat will be replaced by Hamas and Islamic Jihad."51

The PA is in financial crisis, too. While financial records are nearly impossible to track in Arafat's regime, the PA's annual revenue has reportedly fallen from more than $600 million to just $27 million.52 By some estimates, the PA's collective net worth is down by more than two thirds, due to corruption, a decline in productivity, and the drying up of foreign aid.53

These financial woes have forced the PA to cut administrative salaries. Not surprisingly then, the Arabic daily al-Hayat al-Jadida reported in September that presumably unpaid "senior figures in the PA are … leaving the area that is their responsibility without permission from above."54

Writes Tom Rose, publisher of The Jerusalem Post:
Public infrastructure has disintegrated. Public health standards, just seven years ago the highest in the Arab world, are among the lowest. And the disastrously self-destructive terrorist war against Israel … has reduced Palestinians to the most desperate conditions they have seen since the creation of Israel in 1948.55
These desperate conditions have taken their toll. An increasing number of Palestinian Christians have left because of economic reasons and because their place in the predominantly Muslim Palestinian society is less certain. But Christians are only one segment of society in flight. According to the Israeli Ha'aretz daily, one year into the intifada, there was "a dramatic rise of hundreds of percent in the number of Palestinians who want to leave the territories and move to a Western country. They are Palestinians who have no way to keep going in the present situation, so they decide to leave."56With unemployment estimated at approximately 70 percent, this should come as no surprise. Still, as this "brain drain" continues, the Palestinian people lose the valuable moderates who could contribute greatly to a future state.

Finally, nineteen months of Palestinian violence have taken its toll in one other important way. After a string of Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombings in December 2001 and again in April 2002, Israel reached its breaking point. Fingering the PA for not doing enough to prevent terror, Israel's defense forces began a methodical campaign that has since destroyed key PA security and governmental targets. In several Palestinian cities and refugee camps, Israel cut a path of destruction in its effort to root out terrorists. The setback to the Palestinian cause has been incalculable. At the same time, if events cast Arafat aside, there is no clear successor, and analysts increasingly predict a civil war.

Balance Sheet

To the argument that these uprisings were self-defeating, there are those who claim that the Palestinians did benefit from the resort to violence. After all, following the first uprising, the British issued a White Paper in 1939 that reneged on the policy of supporting a Jewish national homeland in Palestine. The intifada of the late 1980s also resulted in the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo accords, which put the Palestinian Authority on the map. And even today, there are those—Palestinians and others—who believe that the present uprising will culminate in statehood. In Hamas, uprisings are seen as essential steps toward the destruction of Israel. After that, said Hamas leader Mahmud az-Zahar, the Jews could remain, living "in an Islamic state with Islamic law."57

But the fact is that despite this uprising and its two predecessors, the Palestinians still have no state, and the cost of the uprisings to Palestinian society is indisputable.

The first uprising effectively destroyed the Palestinian nationalist movement. After the Arab revolt, the movement was rendered leaderless, ineffectual, and paralyzed. When the surrounding Arab states declared war on the newly established state of Israel in 1948, the Palestinians could do little to control their own collective destiny. Those who fought the Israelis were disorganized and often disarmed by the organized Arab armies. Untold numbers of others simply fled their homes in fear or despair. When the belligerent Arab states acknowledged that they had lost the war through various armistice agreements in 1949, this was the final nail in the coffin for the Palestinian movement. It was not to be reincarnated, arguably, until Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement gained momentum in 1965—a full sixteen years later.

The second uprising also led Palestinian society to the verge of collapse—until Israel and the United States intervened with initiatives for Palestinian statehood. The Palestinian economy was decimated; Palestinians were increasingly engaging in internecine conflict; radicalism was on the rise; and while there was cooperation among the UNLU, there was no clear vision for a future Palestinian state. Only by artificially resuscitating Yasir Arafat from Tunisian exile did Israel and the United States steer the Palestinian people toward an interim state. And because no Palestinian leader (including Arafat) could produce a true forward-looking vision for a future state, the United States and Israel set the parameters of the West Bank-Gaza proto-state during its formative years.

While strange turns cannot be ruled out in the Middle East, the current "intrafada" also has the odor of a defeat. The violence has again destroyed the Palestinian economy, while radicalism, fratricide, and internal squabbles continue to erode society at an alarming rate. Worse, perhaps, is that this current round of violence has undermined the confidence of supporters of the "peace process" in the United States, Israel, and the Arab world. The result, in Israel and the United States, has been a swing to the right of the political spectrum and a general distrust of Palestinian objectives. It will now take years for former moderates to believe again in the concept of rapprochement and perhaps even longer for Israeli-Palestinian relations to rebound.

More important, as a direct result of the intra-Palestinian violence that accompanied these uprisings, the Palestinians are arguably no more prepared for statehood today than they were in 1936. They are simply more destitute, more fragmented, and more radical. Wrote Don Peretz in 1990:
While even the most ideologically contradictory factions have been able to paper over their differences temporarily, internecine conflict will very likely erupt among them when the time comes for the Palestinians to determine their political future.58
Peretz was on target. Throughout Palestinian history, conflicts between the diverse but staunch political and religious factions have often erupted into open warfare when "fundamentalist groups battled secularists, and when secularists fought among themselves, with makeshift weapons such as chains, iron bars, clubs, and Molotov cocktails. Since the intifada most of these violent clashes have halted, but ideological tensions continue."59 As Khalil Shiqaqi recently noted, the Palestinians are once again feuding over the future of a Palestinian state, and it is leading them to the brink of civil war.60

If we are to learn from history, one lesson is glaringly obvious. For the Palestinians to end their misery, they must articulate a forward-looking vision of a Palestinian state built upon the creation of a Palestinian civil society, rather than the destruction of Israel and obsession with the mistakes of the past. Only when Palestinians abandon their resort to uprisings will it be possible to establish a viable Palestinian state, living in peace alongside Israel. The sooner Palestinians are made to acknowledge the error of the Al-Aqsa intifada, and the uprisings that came before it, the sooner legitimate Palestinian national aspirations can be addressed.

Jonathan Schanzer is a research fellow at the Middle East Forum.

1 Kenneth Stein, "The Intifadah and the 1936-1939 Uprising: A Comparison," The Journal of Palestine Studies, 76 (1990): 64-85.
2 Kenneth Stein, "The Intifadah and the Uprising of 1936-1939: A Comparison of the Palestinian Arab Communities," in Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Intifadah: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World and the Superpowers (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), pp. 3-11.
3 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 123.
4 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 94.
5 Yehoshua Porath, "The Political Organization of the Palestinian Arabs under the British Mandate," in Moshe Ma'oz, ed., Palestinian Arab Politics (Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1975), p. 17.
6 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p. 115.
7 Smith, Palestine, p. 101; Porath "Political Organization," p. 18.
8 Stein, "The Intifadah," in Freedman, The Intifadah, p. 25.
9 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p. 101.
10 p. 116.
11 p. 104.
12 p. 97.
13 Ibid., quoting W.F. Abboushi.
14 Stein, "The Intifadah," in Freedman, The Intifadah, p. 19.
15 Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 99.
16 p. 91.
17 Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 257.
18 David Pollock, "The American Response to the Intifada," in Freedman, The Intifadah, p. 130.
19 Bard E. O'Neill, "The Intifada in the Context of Armed Struggle," in Freedman, The Intifadah, pp. 57-58.
20 Associated Press, Aug. 20, 2001, at http://detnews.com/2001/nation/0108/21/a07-273442.htm.
21 Schiff and Yaari, Intifada, p. 148.
22 Ibid.
23 p. 256.
24 Peretz, Intifada, p. 91.
25 p. 103.
26 p. 96.
27 p. 83.
28 p. 84.
29 p. 86.
30 p. 84.
31 "Minors Killed Since 9 December 1987," at http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Minors_Killed.asp.
32 Justine McCabe, "Sowing Seeds of War," The Hartford Courant, Jan. 1, 2000, at http://www.ctgreens.org/articles/sowing_010101.html, summarizing the 1990 report by the Swedish Save the Children, "The Status of Palestinian Children during the Uprising in the Occupied Territories."
33 Stein, "The Intifadah," in Freedman, p. 17, quoting Yitzhak Rabin interview, Dec. 15, 1989.
34 Ronen Sebag, "Lebanon: The Intifada's False Premise," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002, pp. 13-21.
35 At http://www.palestinercs.org.
36 "Minors Killed Since 9 December 1987," at http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Minors_Killed.asp.
37 At http://www.dci-pal.org/english/dcipress/releases/2001/0024.html.
38 The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 10, 2001.
39 Yedi'ot Aharonot(Tel Aviv), Dec. 13. 2000.
40 Agence France-Presse, Oct. 17, 2001.
41 A list of collaborator killings is at http://www.phrmg.org/aqsa/collaborators.htm.
42 CNN, Feb. 5, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/02/05/trial.shooting/index.html.
43 The National Post, Sept. 4, 2001.
44 Time Magazine, Aug. 27, 2001
45 The Austin American Statesman, Aug. 7, 2001.
46 The Jerusalem Report, Apr. 25, 2001.
47 Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2002, p. 89.
48 p. 90.
49 p. 93.
50 p. 92.
51 The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 19, 2001.
52 The Toronto Star, Nov. 11, 2001.
53 The Weekly Standard, Jan. 21, 2002.
54 Hasan al-Kashif, cited in Ha'aretz, Sept. 5, 2001.
55 The Weekly Standard, Jan. 21, 2002.
56 Ha'aretz (magazine), Oct. 5, 2001.
57 The New York Times, Apr. 4, 2002.
58 Peretz, p. 100.
59 p. 101.
60 Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," p. 90.

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