Jonathan Schanzer11/27/2008
The Role of Fatah
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
Thursday, November 27, 2008
Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Jonathan Schanzer, director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center. He has served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury and as a research fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of the new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine. Daniel Pipes wrote the foreword to the book and some of the research was undertaken at Pipes' Middle East Forum.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, good to have you back.
Schanzer: Good to be back, Jamie.
FP: I'd like to talk to you today about Fatah’s role in the Palestinian civil war. But first, for our readers, describe the thesis of your new book..
Schanzer: The book is about the power struggle between the Palestinian Fatah faction and its Islamist rival, Hamas. The struggle between these two violent organizations dates back to 1988, in the early days of the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, when Hamas began to compete openly with Fatah and the PLO, which were both controlled by Yasir Arafat. What began as a political struggle has since evolved into a violent conflict for control of what are commonly regarded as the Palestinian territories – the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What is hard for readers to understand is that there really may not be a “good guy” and a “bad guy” in this struggle. In fact, radio personality Michael Medved likes to joke that this struggle is not unlike the movie, “Alien vs. Predator.”
FP: This is an important point. What exactly is the background of the Fatah organization?
Schanzer: Fatah was formed in 1958 as a socialist, revolutionary guerrilla group with the intent to destroy Israel. Fatah was actually founded by a number of practicing Muslims, some with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, including Yasir Arafat. The group’s original name was Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniya (Palestinian Liberation Movement), with an acronym that should have read “HATAF.” However, the group elected to reverse the order of the letters to give it a Quranic meaning; FATAH means “conquest” or “victory.” Thus began the Fatah tradition of adopting Islamist words and symbols when convenient.
By 1960, Fatah began to publish a magazine called Filastinuna: Nida’ al-Hayat (Our Palestine: The Call to Life), which left the impression that there was an active Palestinian underground. Then, in 1965, Fatah launched a series of attacks against Israel from Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian territory. Nearly all of them failed. By 1966 and 1967, however, Arafat’s terrorist group was responsible for dozens of attacks, some successful.
After the June 1967 Six-Day War when Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza, Arab regimes were disgraced. Perhaps the only Arab personality to emerge with more power was Arafat, who captured the imagination of the Arab world as a Palestinian “freedom fighter.”
In 1968, Arafat took control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was originally created by the Arab League. When Arafat and Fatah infiltrated the PLO, it soon became synonymous with shocking acts of terrorism around the world.
FP: Please describe those acts of terror.
Schanzer: The spate of violence carried out by Yasir Arafat’s Fatah-backed PLO against civilians in the 1960s and 1970s was unprecedented. Beginning in 1968, Palestinian terrorists initiated 35 airplane hijackings. Other acts of terror included the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games; the 1973 attack on the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, that led to the murder of the U.S. embassy’s chief of mission; and the 1985 attack on the cruise ship Achille Lauro, in which a wheelchair-bound American Jew was shot dead and dumped into the ocean.
FP: Were Jews and Israelis the only victims?
Schanzer: No. The mere presence of Arafat’s Fatah and PLO produced death and destruction in nearly every territory they inhabited.
In the early 1970s, for example, the Fatah-backed PLO attempted to hijack the kingdom of Jordan. The result was Black September, a bloody war that resulted in thousands of Palestinian and Jordanian casualties, and the eventual ouster of the PLO.
Fatah and the PLO then attempted to create a mini-state inside Lebanon in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which contributed to a brutal civil war. Unable to control the violence launched against it from the north, Israel invaded Lebanon and the Palestinians were forced to flee once again, leaving a decimated Lebanon in their wake.
Finally, following a decade of exile in Tunisia, the PLO descended on the West Bank and Gaza after the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993. Since then, the two territories have plummeted into utter disarray, culminating in the 2007 civil war and the violent Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.
Thus, with the exception of Tunisia, every home base of the PLO has been destroyed by the tragic blight of the Palestinian mini-state.
FP: So why is Fatah commonly referred to as the “good guy” in the mainstream media?
Schanzer: Arafat worked with Israel and the United States in the name of Middle East peace from 1988 to 2000. However, he was also responsible for attacks during that time against Israel. Then, in the year 2000, when peace talks broke down, Arafat launched a war against Israel known as the al-Aqsa Intifada. He called upon Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to join forces with Fatah to “march on Jerusalem.” The intifada resulted in more than 1,000 Israeli civilian and military deaths and perhaps 5,000 Palestinian deaths.
FP: What about this recent flare up in violence with Hamas? Is Fatah the good guy there?
Schanzer: Fatah is commonly viewed as the less aggressive of the two primary Palestinian factions. This is misleading. After the 2007 Hamas coup that toppled Gaza, Fatah set out to get even with its Hamas rivals in the West Bank. Fatah rounded up hundreds of known Hamas activists throughout the West Bank. Scores of other acts of violence were reported around the West Bank. Fatah’s leadership was undeniably responsible for dismantling a number of Hamas-controlled city councils, along with charities and businesses tied to Hamas in the West Bank. Some Hamas political offices were set ablaze. In less than one year, hundreds of Hamas charities were shut down.
By the fall of 2007, rights groups were reporting that Fatah was using “the same practices on Hamas detainees that Hamas is using on Fatah detainees in Gaza.” According to one report, 600 suspected Hamas members were arrested in the West Bank between June and October 2007. Amnesty International claimed the figure was closer to 1,000. As arrests continued into 2008, Palestinians wondered whether Fatah was any less brutal than Hamas.
Just like Hamas in Gaza, Fatah also engaged in heavy-handed press restrictions. Fatah arrested several journalists sympathetic to Hamas. Indeed, Fatah arrested the director of the Amal television channel, which is not affiliated with Hamas, but had aired a speech by Hamas’ political leader in Gaza, Ismael Haniyeh, which the police said was “illegal.”
FP: Did Israel approve of these crackdowns?
Schanzer: In some cases, Israel helped Fatah round up Hamas terrorists. But, for the Israelis, Fatah’s successes were bittersweet. For years, Fatah leaders had claimed that the very presence of Israeli forces in the West Bank made it impossible to detain Palestinians linked to terrorist attacks. All the while, Hamas, PIJ, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades carried out suicide bombings and other attacks against Israeli civilians.
Finally, with a clear interest in neutralizing Hamas, Fatah has accomplished what it always insisted it could not: a clampdown on Hamas operatives within its jurisdiction.
FP: So, what exactly are the differences between Hamas and Fatah?
Schanzer: The main difference is that Fatah has a faction within that appears to be interested in negotiating peace with Israel, while Hamas is unanimous in its refusal to engage.
Still, there are fewer differences than the mainstream media would have us believe. The charters of both Hamas and Fatah both openly call for the destruction of Israel. Both groups have been consistently responsible for terrorist attacks against Israel. And both appear to be willing to let the Palestinian people suffer as the struggle continues for control of the Palestinian territories.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, thank you for joining Frontpage Interview.
Schanzer: Thanks again for having me, Jamie. It has been a pleasure.
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz’s Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com.
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
Thursday, November 27, 2008
Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Jonathan Schanzer, director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center. He has served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury and as a research fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of the new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine. Daniel Pipes wrote the foreword to the book and some of the research was undertaken at Pipes' Middle East Forum.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, good to have you back.
Schanzer: Good to be back, Jamie.
FP: I'd like to talk to you today about Fatah’s role in the Palestinian civil war. But first, for our readers, describe the thesis of your new book..
Schanzer: The book is about the power struggle between the Palestinian Fatah faction and its Islamist rival, Hamas. The struggle between these two violent organizations dates back to 1988, in the early days of the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, when Hamas began to compete openly with Fatah and the PLO, which were both controlled by Yasir Arafat. What began as a political struggle has since evolved into a violent conflict for control of what are commonly regarded as the Palestinian territories – the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What is hard for readers to understand is that there really may not be a “good guy” and a “bad guy” in this struggle. In fact, radio personality Michael Medved likes to joke that this struggle is not unlike the movie, “Alien vs. Predator.”
FP: This is an important point. What exactly is the background of the Fatah organization?
Schanzer: Fatah was formed in 1958 as a socialist, revolutionary guerrilla group with the intent to destroy Israel. Fatah was actually founded by a number of practicing Muslims, some with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, including Yasir Arafat. The group’s original name was Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniya (Palestinian Liberation Movement), with an acronym that should have read “HATAF.” However, the group elected to reverse the order of the letters to give it a Quranic meaning; FATAH means “conquest” or “victory.” Thus began the Fatah tradition of adopting Islamist words and symbols when convenient.
By 1960, Fatah began to publish a magazine called Filastinuna: Nida’ al-Hayat (Our Palestine: The Call to Life), which left the impression that there was an active Palestinian underground. Then, in 1965, Fatah launched a series of attacks against Israel from Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian territory. Nearly all of them failed. By 1966 and 1967, however, Arafat’s terrorist group was responsible for dozens of attacks, some successful.
After the June 1967 Six-Day War when Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza, Arab regimes were disgraced. Perhaps the only Arab personality to emerge with more power was Arafat, who captured the imagination of the Arab world as a Palestinian “freedom fighter.”
In 1968, Arafat took control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was originally created by the Arab League. When Arafat and Fatah infiltrated the PLO, it soon became synonymous with shocking acts of terrorism around the world.
FP: Please describe those acts of terror.
Schanzer: The spate of violence carried out by Yasir Arafat’s Fatah-backed PLO against civilians in the 1960s and 1970s was unprecedented. Beginning in 1968, Palestinian terrorists initiated 35 airplane hijackings. Other acts of terror included the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games; the 1973 attack on the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, that led to the murder of the U.S. embassy’s chief of mission; and the 1985 attack on the cruise ship Achille Lauro, in which a wheelchair-bound American Jew was shot dead and dumped into the ocean.
FP: Were Jews and Israelis the only victims?
Schanzer: No. The mere presence of Arafat’s Fatah and PLO produced death and destruction in nearly every territory they inhabited.
In the early 1970s, for example, the Fatah-backed PLO attempted to hijack the kingdom of Jordan. The result was Black September, a bloody war that resulted in thousands of Palestinian and Jordanian casualties, and the eventual ouster of the PLO.
Fatah and the PLO then attempted to create a mini-state inside Lebanon in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which contributed to a brutal civil war. Unable to control the violence launched against it from the north, Israel invaded Lebanon and the Palestinians were forced to flee once again, leaving a decimated Lebanon in their wake.
Finally, following a decade of exile in Tunisia, the PLO descended on the West Bank and Gaza after the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993. Since then, the two territories have plummeted into utter disarray, culminating in the 2007 civil war and the violent Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.
Thus, with the exception of Tunisia, every home base of the PLO has been destroyed by the tragic blight of the Palestinian mini-state.
FP: So why is Fatah commonly referred to as the “good guy” in the mainstream media?
Schanzer: Arafat worked with Israel and the United States in the name of Middle East peace from 1988 to 2000. However, he was also responsible for attacks during that time against Israel. Then, in the year 2000, when peace talks broke down, Arafat launched a war against Israel known as the al-Aqsa Intifada. He called upon Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to join forces with Fatah to “march on Jerusalem.” The intifada resulted in more than 1,000 Israeli civilian and military deaths and perhaps 5,000 Palestinian deaths.
FP: What about this recent flare up in violence with Hamas? Is Fatah the good guy there?
Schanzer: Fatah is commonly viewed as the less aggressive of the two primary Palestinian factions. This is misleading. After the 2007 Hamas coup that toppled Gaza, Fatah set out to get even with its Hamas rivals in the West Bank. Fatah rounded up hundreds of known Hamas activists throughout the West Bank. Scores of other acts of violence were reported around the West Bank. Fatah’s leadership was undeniably responsible for dismantling a number of Hamas-controlled city councils, along with charities and businesses tied to Hamas in the West Bank. Some Hamas political offices were set ablaze. In less than one year, hundreds of Hamas charities were shut down.
By the fall of 2007, rights groups were reporting that Fatah was using “the same practices on Hamas detainees that Hamas is using on Fatah detainees in Gaza.” According to one report, 600 suspected Hamas members were arrested in the West Bank between June and October 2007. Amnesty International claimed the figure was closer to 1,000. As arrests continued into 2008, Palestinians wondered whether Fatah was any less brutal than Hamas.
Just like Hamas in Gaza, Fatah also engaged in heavy-handed press restrictions. Fatah arrested several journalists sympathetic to Hamas. Indeed, Fatah arrested the director of the Amal television channel, which is not affiliated with Hamas, but had aired a speech by Hamas’ political leader in Gaza, Ismael Haniyeh, which the police said was “illegal.”
FP: Did Israel approve of these crackdowns?
Schanzer: In some cases, Israel helped Fatah round up Hamas terrorists. But, for the Israelis, Fatah’s successes were bittersweet. For years, Fatah leaders had claimed that the very presence of Israeli forces in the West Bank made it impossible to detain Palestinians linked to terrorist attacks. All the while, Hamas, PIJ, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades carried out suicide bombings and other attacks against Israeli civilians.
Finally, with a clear interest in neutralizing Hamas, Fatah has accomplished what it always insisted it could not: a clampdown on Hamas operatives within its jurisdiction.
FP: So, what exactly are the differences between Hamas and Fatah?
Schanzer: The main difference is that Fatah has a faction within that appears to be interested in negotiating peace with Israel, while Hamas is unanimous in its refusal to engage.
Still, there are fewer differences than the mainstream media would have us believe. The charters of both Hamas and Fatah both openly call for the destruction of Israel. Both groups have been consistently responsible for terrorist attacks against Israel. And both appear to be willing to let the Palestinian people suffer as the struggle continues for control of the Palestinian territories.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, thank you for joining Frontpage Interview.
Schanzer: Thanks again for having me, Jamie. It has been a pleasure.
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz’s Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com.
11/23/2008
Palestinian Civil War Casts Shadow Over Peace Talks
by Jonathan Schanzer
JTA
November 23, 2008
WASHINGTON -- President-elect Barack Obama's refrain of "change" has become a source of inspiration to many American Jews who wish to see Palestinian-Israeli peace talks assume greater importance as compared to the last eight years under President Bush. They have been further buoyed by the fact that Dennis Ross, the former Clinton administration Middle East negotiator and now Obama adviser, recently launched a media offensive to lay the groundwork for regional diplomacy.
While peace is in everyone's interest, American Jewry should be warned that it will be more difficult to achieve than ever. As if things weren't complicated enough, new challenges stem from the lack of a Palestinian interlocutor. Indeed, Hamas and Fatah—the two largest Palestinian factions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—are now engaged in a bitter civil war. As long as Hamas and Fatah remain two non-governments ruling two non-states, Middle East diplomacy simply cannot succeed.
As I note in my new book, "Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine," the Hamas-Fatah conflict dates back to the outbreak of the first intifada of 1987. Amid the violence Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, challenged Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction with competing leaflets and guidance on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza.
By 1993, the political rivalry gave way to sharp disagreements and occasional violence over Fatah's engagement in peace talks with Israel. During the subsequent Oslo years, prompted and armed by Washington and Jerusalem, Fatah cracked down on the suicide-bombing Hamas organization. Quietly, a Palestinian civil war was brewing.
After the peace process collapsed in 2000, Arafat launched the ill-fated second intifada in which both Hamas and Fatah temporarily joined forces against Israel. While Israel responded with force against both factions, its strikes against Arafat's power structure—the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority—led to the effective dissolution of the quasi-government created by the Oslo process. The territories became lawless. Clans, families and tribes assumed the role of government.
When Arafat died in November 2004, Mahmoud Abbas succeeded him. While Abbas had long been Arafat's deputy, he lacked Arafat's charisma. He, too, failed to gain control of the territories.
Chaos and confusion worsened after the Palestinians held elections in January 2006. The Palestinians overwhelmingly supported Hamas, respected for its steadfast resistance to Israel and appreciated by the majority of Palestinians for the suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. The outcome surprised decision-makers in Washington and Jerusalem, who in turn backed Fatah's efforts to block Hamas from assuming control of the territories.
After more than a year of sporadic firefights and spiteful public exchanges, Hamas launched a military offensive in June 2007 that crushed Fatah's political and military positions throughout the Gaza Strip. Human rights groups reported that Palestinians were pushing rival faction members off tall buildings to their death, while others were shot point blank in the limbs to ensure permanent damage. Members of both factions were kidnapped off the streets and held without cause.
Since then, two illegitimate governments have separately ruled the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The civil war has continued unabated, despite the best efforts of Arab states seeking to reconcile the conflict, including Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and even Mauritania.
When President-elect Obama moves into the White House in January and sets out to rekindle Palestinian-Israeli peace, he will be faced with a vexing problem: Which Palestinian faction/non-state represents the Palestinians? With whom should Washington negotiate?
If it is Abbas' Fatah West Bank faction, Obama will be working with an unelected government while effectively ignoring the Hamas regime in Gaza, where an estimated 1.5 million Palestinians reside. If the president negotiates with Hamas, he would be negotiating with terrorists—something that would fly in the face of U.S. policy dating back to the Nixon administration.
It is also worthy to note that amid their clashing, Hamas and Fatah have failed to articulate a vision for the state they insist they deserve. As one Al-Jazeera analyst noted, "The rivalry between Fatah and Hamas had eclipsed demands for putting forward a Palestinian negotiating strategy."
Until now it is unclear whether Obama and his advisers will address the internecine Palestinian conflict as a key component in their Middle East foreign policy. If they fail to confront this critical issue, we risk engaging in yet another failed round of diplomacy. And as we have seen in the past, failure at the negotiating table can often lead to renewed conflict.
Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism analyst for the U.S. Treasury Department, is the director of policy for the Jewish Policy Center and author of "Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine" (Palgrave Macmillan).
by Jonathan Schanzer
JTA
November 23, 2008
WASHINGTON -- President-elect Barack Obama's refrain of "change" has become a source of inspiration to many American Jews who wish to see Palestinian-Israeli peace talks assume greater importance as compared to the last eight years under President Bush. They have been further buoyed by the fact that Dennis Ross, the former Clinton administration Middle East negotiator and now Obama adviser, recently launched a media offensive to lay the groundwork for regional diplomacy.
While peace is in everyone's interest, American Jewry should be warned that it will be more difficult to achieve than ever. As if things weren't complicated enough, new challenges stem from the lack of a Palestinian interlocutor. Indeed, Hamas and Fatah—the two largest Palestinian factions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—are now engaged in a bitter civil war. As long as Hamas and Fatah remain two non-governments ruling two non-states, Middle East diplomacy simply cannot succeed.
As I note in my new book, "Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine," the Hamas-Fatah conflict dates back to the outbreak of the first intifada of 1987. Amid the violence Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, challenged Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction with competing leaflets and guidance on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza.
By 1993, the political rivalry gave way to sharp disagreements and occasional violence over Fatah's engagement in peace talks with Israel. During the subsequent Oslo years, prompted and armed by Washington and Jerusalem, Fatah cracked down on the suicide-bombing Hamas organization. Quietly, a Palestinian civil war was brewing.
After the peace process collapsed in 2000, Arafat launched the ill-fated second intifada in which both Hamas and Fatah temporarily joined forces against Israel. While Israel responded with force against both factions, its strikes against Arafat's power structure—the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority—led to the effective dissolution of the quasi-government created by the Oslo process. The territories became lawless. Clans, families and tribes assumed the role of government.
When Arafat died in November 2004, Mahmoud Abbas succeeded him. While Abbas had long been Arafat's deputy, he lacked Arafat's charisma. He, too, failed to gain control of the territories.
Chaos and confusion worsened after the Palestinians held elections in January 2006. The Palestinians overwhelmingly supported Hamas, respected for its steadfast resistance to Israel and appreciated by the majority of Palestinians for the suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. The outcome surprised decision-makers in Washington and Jerusalem, who in turn backed Fatah's efforts to block Hamas from assuming control of the territories.
After more than a year of sporadic firefights and spiteful public exchanges, Hamas launched a military offensive in June 2007 that crushed Fatah's political and military positions throughout the Gaza Strip. Human rights groups reported that Palestinians were pushing rival faction members off tall buildings to their death, while others were shot point blank in the limbs to ensure permanent damage. Members of both factions were kidnapped off the streets and held without cause.
Since then, two illegitimate governments have separately ruled the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The civil war has continued unabated, despite the best efforts of Arab states seeking to reconcile the conflict, including Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and even Mauritania.
When President-elect Obama moves into the White House in January and sets out to rekindle Palestinian-Israeli peace, he will be faced with a vexing problem: Which Palestinian faction/non-state represents the Palestinians? With whom should Washington negotiate?
If it is Abbas' Fatah West Bank faction, Obama will be working with an unelected government while effectively ignoring the Hamas regime in Gaza, where an estimated 1.5 million Palestinians reside. If the president negotiates with Hamas, he would be negotiating with terrorists—something that would fly in the face of U.S. policy dating back to the Nixon administration.
It is also worthy to note that amid their clashing, Hamas and Fatah have failed to articulate a vision for the state they insist they deserve. As one Al-Jazeera analyst noted, "The rivalry between Fatah and Hamas had eclipsed demands for putting forward a Palestinian negotiating strategy."
Until now it is unclear whether Obama and his advisers will address the internecine Palestinian conflict as a key component in their Middle East foreign policy. If they fail to confront this critical issue, we risk engaging in yet another failed round of diplomacy. And as we have seen in the past, failure at the negotiating table can often lead to renewed conflict.
Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism analyst for the U.S. Treasury Department, is the director of policy for the Jewish Policy Center and author of "Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine" (Palgrave Macmillan).
11/20/2008
The Mullahs' Role in the Hamas-Fatah Conflict
by Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
November 20, 2008
Frontpage Interview's guest today is Jonathan Schanzer, director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center. He has served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury and as a research fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of the new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine. Daniel Pipes wrote the foreword to the book and some of the research was undertaken at Pipes' Middle East Forum.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, good to have you back.
Schanzer: Good to be back Jamie.
FP: I'd like to talk to you today about Iran's role in the conflict between Hamas and Fatah. But first, for readers who did not read our previous interview, please describe the thesis of your new book Hamas vs Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine.
Schanzer: The book is about the power struggle between the Palestinian Fatah faction and its Islamist rival, Hamas. This struggle dates back to 1988, in the early days of the Palestinian uprising known as the intifada, when Hamas began to circulate bayanat, or leaflets, in competition for leadership. Thereafter, the two factions have engaged in a political and now violent struggle for control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Today, I argue, it may be this struggle that represents the greatest obstacle to regional peace, eclipsing even the typical Palestinian-Israeli issues that typically dominate the headlines.
FP: Ok, describe for us Iran's historical role in Palestinian affairs.
Schanzer: It began in 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini succeeded in ousting Iran's Reza Shah Pahlavi from power. In mid-February, just days after his revolution was complete, Fatah/PLO leader Yasir Arafat enjoyed a personal audience with Khomeini. While it was reported that Khomeini lectured Arafat on his need to drop his nationalist and revolutionary ideologies and embrace Islamism, photos of the meeting show the two men, in typical Arafat fashion, smiling and holding hands.
Khomeini, in fact, wished to thank Arafat for the Fatah leader's support for the Iranian revolution. Arafat even helped the Shah's opponents by providing training and weapons. The first generation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards was the recipient of Arafat's largesse. Khomeini, in appreciation, closed the Israeli embassy in Tehran and handed the keys over to Arafat, and flew a Palestinian flag above it. The building became the PLO's official embassy there.
FP: When and why did Iran-Fatah ties sour?
Schanzer: Relations deteriorated during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, as the Palestinians threw their support behind Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Khomeini rejected Arafat's attempts to mediate the conflict. It was, however, the Palestinian leader's decision to engage in peace talks with the Israelis that ultimately led to the unraveling of Fatah-Iranian ties. Indeed, Khomeini's successor, Ali Khameini dubbed Arafat "a traitor and an idiot" for engaging in talks with Israel.
FP: When did Iran begin to support Hamas ?
Schanzer: Hamas, an offshoot of the Sunni Muslim brotherhood organization, was created in 1988 as a "resistance" organization. Its sole purpose, according to its charter and its leading cleric Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was to destroy the State of Israel, and to replace it with an Islamic Palestine.
Despite the fact that Hamas is Sunni and Iran is Shiite, the Islamist approach of both parties made their marriage almost inevitable. Hamas was clearly in synch with Iran's Islamist policies. As early as December 1990, three years into the intifada, Hamas leaders paid an official visit to Iran, along with other rejectionist groups, for a conference in support of the uprising. In 1994, Hamas began a campaign of suicide bombings against Israel. This was the first time a Sunni group had carried out this kind of attack. Until then, suicide bombing was always associated with Iranian-backed Hizbullah.
In December 1994, as peace talks between the PLO and Israel began to gain traction, hundreds of Iranian demonstrators occupied the PLO embassy in Tehran, destroying property, and calling Arafat the "biggest collaborator with Israel and the United States." The Iranians distanced themselves from the incident, but Tehran was now openly offering Tunisia-based PLO members support for their opposition to Arafat. There were even press reports of Iranian attempts to assassinate Arafat. The Hamas representative to Iran openly gloated that the growing ties between Hamas and Iran came at the expense of the PLO.
FP: How did Arafat react to this new reality?
Schanzer: As early as 1992, Arafat complained that Iran had provided some $30 million to Hamas. This would appear to corroborate a Lebanese report that Iran was providing the Islamist group with $10 million per year in funds derived from oil sales. Hazy reports emerged of Iranians training Hamas members in Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran itself.
In an attempt to weaken its Iranian-funded rival, Arafat found support from Israel and the United States. The 1995 U.S. trade embargo on Iran and the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) were designed, at least in part, to weaken Iranian support to Arafat's chief opposition.
Meanwhile, on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza, a low level conflict was quietly brewing between Hamas and Fatah. Every time Hamas carried out an attack in Israel, it was a signal that the Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority lacked control. Prompted and armed by Washington and Jerusalem, Fatah cracked down on the suicide-bombing Hamas organization.
FP: But Arafat launched a war against Israel with the assistance of Hamas in 2000, just a few years later. What changed?
Schanzer: Support for Yasir Arafat's Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority dwindled rapidly on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza during the late 1990s. Progress with Israel was slow, and the Palestinians grew frustrated with PA corruption. Hamas, all the while, gained popular support steadily by sticking to its strategy of opposition to Oslo and violence against the Jewish state.
When the Camp David II talks collapsed in autumn 2000, marking the end of the Oslo process, Arafat elected to launch a war against Israel known as the al-Aqsa Intifada. At the time, Arafat told Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, "We chose the way that religion and history of all Muslims have entrusted to us." In so doing, he appeared to have finally given the Palestinian cause to Islamism. Indeed, in the name of Islam's third holiest site, the al-Aqsa mosque, he exhorted Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to join forces with Fatah's manifold paramilitary groups, including the newly-formed al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
FP: After this change of heart, did Iran begin supporting Fatah again?
Schanzer: Iran provided funding to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, "mostly through Hizbullah." Zakariya Zubeidi, one of the group's West Bank leaders, confirmed that the Brigades coordinated with the Iranian-backed organization. "Without the help of our brothers in Hezbollah, we could not have continued our struggle," he said. "They give us money and weapons. We coordinate our military operations."
Iranian support for Fatah was also confirmed in the capture of the ship the Karine-A, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied weapons through the offices of Hizbullah. Israeli sources suggested that the shipment was the work of the late Imad Mughniyeh, Hizbullah's operations chief, who coordinated closely with the Iranians.
FP: So, why did Fatah continue to lose power in the territories?
Schanzer: The Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority took pounding after pounding from the Israeli military in response to continued terrorist attacks. With its government infrastructure reduced to rubble, Fatah could no longer fill a leadership role. Government services once filled by Fatah were replaced by Hamas and its long-standing dawa, or outreach network, which provided food, education and other vital services.
Meanwhile, the Iranian-backed Hamas faction began to compete for territory once unquestionably controlled by the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian tribes, families, and clans loyal to Hamas fought with those loyal to Fatah. As the mainstream media filed story after predictable story about Israeli-Palestinian violence, the increasingly common internecine Palestinian clashes went largely unreported.
FP: What impact did the death of Yasir Arafat have on this dynamic?
Schanzer: By the time Yasir Arafat died in November 2004, the territories were in utter disarray. In my view, it is around this time that Iran appeared to sense opportunity. Particularly as Saudi Arabian funding for Hamas dried up, Iran took in Hamas as a valued proxy. In light of the rapid decline of the Palestinian Authority, and now its leadership vacuum, Iranian funding for Hamas increased over the next two years, as Hamas consolidated its strength.
FP: What role did Iran play in the 2006 election and the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007?
Schanzer: The extent to which Iran helped Hamas prepare for the 2006 elections is not known. But, after Hamas's electoral victory over Fatah, Iranian influence in the territories reached a zenith. Understandably alarmed, Israel and the United States encouraged the world to impose sanctions against the Hamas regime.
Undeterred, one Hamas spokesman confirmed that Iran "was prepared to cover the entire deficit in the Palestinian budget, and [to do so] continuously." The Bonyad-e Mostazafan za Janbaza (Foundation of the Oppressed and War Veterans), a splinter of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the group that Arafat trained in the 1970s, was also believed to be providing Hamas with critical financial support. During a visit by Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh to Tehran in December 2006, Iran pledged $250 million in aid to compensate for the western boycott.
The standoff continued through June 2007, when Hamas launched a brutal lightning coup that toppled Fatah in Gaza. Within weeks, Fatah intelligence sources were openly accusing Iran of funding the coup and training the fighters. According to Palestinian intelligence chief Tawfiq Tirawi, "it was a joint program with Iran."
FP: What are the implications of Iranian influence in the territories today?
Schanzer: As the Palestinian civil war rages between "Fatahland" in the West Bank and "Hamastan" in the Gaza Strip, Iran remains Hamas' staunchest supporter. Iranian funds and weapons continue to be smuggled into Gaza. Analysts continue to express concern that this support may contribute to a Hamas conquest of the West Bank.
The incoming Israeli and American administrations must recognize that regional peace cannot be achieved until the Palestinian internecine conflict is resolved. And the only way to resolve this conflict is to remove Iran from the equation. As we have now established, Iran has been an integral component of the continued Palestinian turmoil.
More broadly, it must be recognized that Iran is playing a masterful game of chess. Amidst its alarming declarations of intent to achieve nuclear weapons, it has strengthened its Lebanese Hizbullah proxy on the Israeli border, while simultaneously arming its Gaza proxy. Great effort must be now expended to prevent Iran from planting another chess piece in the West Bank. A repeat performance of Gaza may be underway.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, thank you for joining us.
Schanzer: Thank you Jamie.
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz's Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com.
by Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
November 20, 2008
Frontpage Interview's guest today is Jonathan Schanzer, director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center. He has served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury and as a research fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of the new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine. Daniel Pipes wrote the foreword to the book and some of the research was undertaken at Pipes' Middle East Forum.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, good to have you back.
Schanzer: Good to be back Jamie.
FP: I'd like to talk to you today about Iran's role in the conflict between Hamas and Fatah. But first, for readers who did not read our previous interview, please describe the thesis of your new book Hamas vs Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine.
Schanzer: The book is about the power struggle between the Palestinian Fatah faction and its Islamist rival, Hamas. This struggle dates back to 1988, in the early days of the Palestinian uprising known as the intifada, when Hamas began to circulate bayanat, or leaflets, in competition for leadership. Thereafter, the two factions have engaged in a political and now violent struggle for control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Today, I argue, it may be this struggle that represents the greatest obstacle to regional peace, eclipsing even the typical Palestinian-Israeli issues that typically dominate the headlines.
FP: Ok, describe for us Iran's historical role in Palestinian affairs.
Schanzer: It began in 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini succeeded in ousting Iran's Reza Shah Pahlavi from power. In mid-February, just days after his revolution was complete, Fatah/PLO leader Yasir Arafat enjoyed a personal audience with Khomeini. While it was reported that Khomeini lectured Arafat on his need to drop his nationalist and revolutionary ideologies and embrace Islamism, photos of the meeting show the two men, in typical Arafat fashion, smiling and holding hands.
Khomeini, in fact, wished to thank Arafat for the Fatah leader's support for the Iranian revolution. Arafat even helped the Shah's opponents by providing training and weapons. The first generation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards was the recipient of Arafat's largesse. Khomeini, in appreciation, closed the Israeli embassy in Tehran and handed the keys over to Arafat, and flew a Palestinian flag above it. The building became the PLO's official embassy there.
FP: When and why did Iran-Fatah ties sour?
Schanzer: Relations deteriorated during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, as the Palestinians threw their support behind Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Khomeini rejected Arafat's attempts to mediate the conflict. It was, however, the Palestinian leader's decision to engage in peace talks with the Israelis that ultimately led to the unraveling of Fatah-Iranian ties. Indeed, Khomeini's successor, Ali Khameini dubbed Arafat "a traitor and an idiot" for engaging in talks with Israel.
FP: When did Iran begin to support Hamas ?
Schanzer: Hamas, an offshoot of the Sunni Muslim brotherhood organization, was created in 1988 as a "resistance" organization. Its sole purpose, according to its charter and its leading cleric Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was to destroy the State of Israel, and to replace it with an Islamic Palestine.
Despite the fact that Hamas is Sunni and Iran is Shiite, the Islamist approach of both parties made their marriage almost inevitable. Hamas was clearly in synch with Iran's Islamist policies. As early as December 1990, three years into the intifada, Hamas leaders paid an official visit to Iran, along with other rejectionist groups, for a conference in support of the uprising. In 1994, Hamas began a campaign of suicide bombings against Israel. This was the first time a Sunni group had carried out this kind of attack. Until then, suicide bombing was always associated with Iranian-backed Hizbullah.
In December 1994, as peace talks between the PLO and Israel began to gain traction, hundreds of Iranian demonstrators occupied the PLO embassy in Tehran, destroying property, and calling Arafat the "biggest collaborator with Israel and the United States." The Iranians distanced themselves from the incident, but Tehran was now openly offering Tunisia-based PLO members support for their opposition to Arafat. There were even press reports of Iranian attempts to assassinate Arafat. The Hamas representative to Iran openly gloated that the growing ties between Hamas and Iran came at the expense of the PLO.
FP: How did Arafat react to this new reality?
Schanzer: As early as 1992, Arafat complained that Iran had provided some $30 million to Hamas. This would appear to corroborate a Lebanese report that Iran was providing the Islamist group with $10 million per year in funds derived from oil sales. Hazy reports emerged of Iranians training Hamas members in Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran itself.
In an attempt to weaken its Iranian-funded rival, Arafat found support from Israel and the United States. The 1995 U.S. trade embargo on Iran and the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) were designed, at least in part, to weaken Iranian support to Arafat's chief opposition.
Meanwhile, on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza, a low level conflict was quietly brewing between Hamas and Fatah. Every time Hamas carried out an attack in Israel, it was a signal that the Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority lacked control. Prompted and armed by Washington and Jerusalem, Fatah cracked down on the suicide-bombing Hamas organization.
FP: But Arafat launched a war against Israel with the assistance of Hamas in 2000, just a few years later. What changed?
Schanzer: Support for Yasir Arafat's Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority dwindled rapidly on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza during the late 1990s. Progress with Israel was slow, and the Palestinians grew frustrated with PA corruption. Hamas, all the while, gained popular support steadily by sticking to its strategy of opposition to Oslo and violence against the Jewish state.
When the Camp David II talks collapsed in autumn 2000, marking the end of the Oslo process, Arafat elected to launch a war against Israel known as the al-Aqsa Intifada. At the time, Arafat told Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, "We chose the way that religion and history of all Muslims have entrusted to us." In so doing, he appeared to have finally given the Palestinian cause to Islamism. Indeed, in the name of Islam's third holiest site, the al-Aqsa mosque, he exhorted Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to join forces with Fatah's manifold paramilitary groups, including the newly-formed al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
FP: After this change of heart, did Iran begin supporting Fatah again?
Schanzer: Iran provided funding to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, "mostly through Hizbullah." Zakariya Zubeidi, one of the group's West Bank leaders, confirmed that the Brigades coordinated with the Iranian-backed organization. "Without the help of our brothers in Hezbollah, we could not have continued our struggle," he said. "They give us money and weapons. We coordinate our military operations."
Iranian support for Fatah was also confirmed in the capture of the ship the Karine-A, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied weapons through the offices of Hizbullah. Israeli sources suggested that the shipment was the work of the late Imad Mughniyeh, Hizbullah's operations chief, who coordinated closely with the Iranians.
FP: So, why did Fatah continue to lose power in the territories?
Schanzer: The Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority took pounding after pounding from the Israeli military in response to continued terrorist attacks. With its government infrastructure reduced to rubble, Fatah could no longer fill a leadership role. Government services once filled by Fatah were replaced by Hamas and its long-standing dawa, or outreach network, which provided food, education and other vital services.
Meanwhile, the Iranian-backed Hamas faction began to compete for territory once unquestionably controlled by the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian tribes, families, and clans loyal to Hamas fought with those loyal to Fatah. As the mainstream media filed story after predictable story about Israeli-Palestinian violence, the increasingly common internecine Palestinian clashes went largely unreported.
FP: What impact did the death of Yasir Arafat have on this dynamic?
Schanzer: By the time Yasir Arafat died in November 2004, the territories were in utter disarray. In my view, it is around this time that Iran appeared to sense opportunity. Particularly as Saudi Arabian funding for Hamas dried up, Iran took in Hamas as a valued proxy. In light of the rapid decline of the Palestinian Authority, and now its leadership vacuum, Iranian funding for Hamas increased over the next two years, as Hamas consolidated its strength.
FP: What role did Iran play in the 2006 election and the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007?
Schanzer: The extent to which Iran helped Hamas prepare for the 2006 elections is not known. But, after Hamas's electoral victory over Fatah, Iranian influence in the territories reached a zenith. Understandably alarmed, Israel and the United States encouraged the world to impose sanctions against the Hamas regime.
Undeterred, one Hamas spokesman confirmed that Iran "was prepared to cover the entire deficit in the Palestinian budget, and [to do so] continuously." The Bonyad-e Mostazafan za Janbaza (Foundation of the Oppressed and War Veterans), a splinter of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the group that Arafat trained in the 1970s, was also believed to be providing Hamas with critical financial support. During a visit by Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh to Tehran in December 2006, Iran pledged $250 million in aid to compensate for the western boycott.
The standoff continued through June 2007, when Hamas launched a brutal lightning coup that toppled Fatah in Gaza. Within weeks, Fatah intelligence sources were openly accusing Iran of funding the coup and training the fighters. According to Palestinian intelligence chief Tawfiq Tirawi, "it was a joint program with Iran."
FP: What are the implications of Iranian influence in the territories today?
Schanzer: As the Palestinian civil war rages between "Fatahland" in the West Bank and "Hamastan" in the Gaza Strip, Iran remains Hamas' staunchest supporter. Iranian funds and weapons continue to be smuggled into Gaza. Analysts continue to express concern that this support may contribute to a Hamas conquest of the West Bank.
The incoming Israeli and American administrations must recognize that regional peace cannot be achieved until the Palestinian internecine conflict is resolved. And the only way to resolve this conflict is to remove Iran from the equation. As we have now established, Iran has been an integral component of the continued Palestinian turmoil.
More broadly, it must be recognized that Iran is playing a masterful game of chess. Amidst its alarming declarations of intent to achieve nuclear weapons, it has strengthened its Lebanese Hizbullah proxy on the Israeli border, while simultaneously arming its Gaza proxy. Great effort must be now expended to prevent Iran from planting another chess piece in the West Bank. A repeat performance of Gaza may be underway.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, thank you for joining us.
Schanzer: Thank you Jamie.
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz's Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com.
11/18/2008
First-Person Statement on "Hamas vs. Fatah"
Middle East Strategy at Harvard
November 18, 2008
MESH invites selected authors to offer original first-person statements on their new books—why and how they wrote them, and what impact they hope and expect to achieve. Jonathan Schanzer is director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center and a former counterterrorism analyst for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of Treasury. His new book is Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine.
From Jonathan Schanzer
During the violent Hamas conquest of Gaza in the summer of 2007, when hundreds of Palestinians were killed by their own, I was struck by the weak and fleeting media attention, particularly compared to flare-ups of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over the years. I also noted that Middle Eastern studies professors avoided the subject. With the notable exception of the Jerusalem Post's Khaled Abu Toameh and a few others, it seemed as if observers of the Middle East were only interested in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is tired and well-worn ground. I quickly realized that there was an important book to be written.
The Palestinians are usually described as one united people with one goal: statehood. My book questions this. In fact, throughout the book, which tracks the histories of both Hamas and Fatah, it becomes increasingly clear that the Palestinians actually lack a coherent vision for their future. The Hamas faction seeks an Islamist polity. The Fatah faction seeks a more secular one. Opposition to Israel is perhaps the only issue upon which they truly agree. Yet, Fatah has elected to engage the Israelis (for now), while Hamas is steadfast in its refusal.
What is surprising to some readers is that the Hamas-Fatah conflict is two decades old, dating back to the outbreak of the first intifada of 1987, when the upstart Hamas organization began to challenge Yasir Arafat's Fatah faction with competing bayanat, or leaflets, on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza.
Over time, what began as a political rivalry gave way to sharp disagreements and acrimony over Fatah's engagement in peace talks with Israel during the Oslo years. Upon the prompting of Israel and the United States, Fatah met Hamas suicide bombings against Israel with Fatah crackdowns. Quietly, a Palestinian civil war was brewing.
After the failure of the peace process in 2000 and the subsequent al-Aqsa Intifada, the Palestinians fell into complete disarray. When Yasir Arafat died in 2004, the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) all but collapsed. Clans, families and tribes controlled the streets of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas worked assiduously to fill that vacuum.
In the Palestinian elections of January 2006, Hamas won by a large margin. Only after the final votes were tallied, Fatah refused to allow Hamas to assume control of the government. Conflict erupted between the two sides, marking a bitter standoff. After more than a year of sporadic violence and venomous public exchanges, Hamas carried out a brutal, lightning coup that crushed the PA in Gaza. In June 2007, reports emerged of Palestinians being pushed off tall buildings to their death. Some Palestinians shot rival faction members point blank in the legs to ensure permanent disabilities. Human rights groups reported unlawful imprisonments and torture in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
This unresolved conflict has very serious consequences. For one, Washington and Jerusalem lack a legitimate interlocutor. As they negotiate with Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah faction, they only deal with the ruler of the West Bank (and it is disputable that Abbas even has control of that), and a party that lost the 2006 elections. If they negotiate with Hamas, the rulers of Gaza, they would be negotiating with a terrorist organization, which runs counter to the policies of both governments.
Perhaps a more serious policy challenge is the West Bank-Gaza Strip split. The Palestinians are now represented by two non-states and two non-governments. How can the international community regard them as one political unit?
My new book suggests that it is now the internecine Palestinian conflict—not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict—that represents the first and most obvious obstacle to regional peace. Once this thorny, under-reported conflict is settled, it may be possible to resume productive talks. So long as the Palestinians are a house divided, peace will almost certainly be elusive.
Middle East Strategy at Harvard
November 18, 2008
MESH invites selected authors to offer original first-person statements on their new books—why and how they wrote them, and what impact they hope and expect to achieve. Jonathan Schanzer is director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center and a former counterterrorism analyst for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of Treasury. His new book is Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine.
From Jonathan Schanzer
During the violent Hamas conquest of Gaza in the summer of 2007, when hundreds of Palestinians were killed by their own, I was struck by the weak and fleeting media attention, particularly compared to flare-ups of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over the years. I also noted that Middle Eastern studies professors avoided the subject. With the notable exception of the Jerusalem Post's Khaled Abu Toameh and a few others, it seemed as if observers of the Middle East were only interested in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is tired and well-worn ground. I quickly realized that there was an important book to be written.
The Palestinians are usually described as one united people with one goal: statehood. My book questions this. In fact, throughout the book, which tracks the histories of both Hamas and Fatah, it becomes increasingly clear that the Palestinians actually lack a coherent vision for their future. The Hamas faction seeks an Islamist polity. The Fatah faction seeks a more secular one. Opposition to Israel is perhaps the only issue upon which they truly agree. Yet, Fatah has elected to engage the Israelis (for now), while Hamas is steadfast in its refusal.
What is surprising to some readers is that the Hamas-Fatah conflict is two decades old, dating back to the outbreak of the first intifada of 1987, when the upstart Hamas organization began to challenge Yasir Arafat's Fatah faction with competing bayanat, or leaflets, on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza.
Over time, what began as a political rivalry gave way to sharp disagreements and acrimony over Fatah's engagement in peace talks with Israel during the Oslo years. Upon the prompting of Israel and the United States, Fatah met Hamas suicide bombings against Israel with Fatah crackdowns. Quietly, a Palestinian civil war was brewing.
After the failure of the peace process in 2000 and the subsequent al-Aqsa Intifada, the Palestinians fell into complete disarray. When Yasir Arafat died in 2004, the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) all but collapsed. Clans, families and tribes controlled the streets of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas worked assiduously to fill that vacuum.
In the Palestinian elections of January 2006, Hamas won by a large margin. Only after the final votes were tallied, Fatah refused to allow Hamas to assume control of the government. Conflict erupted between the two sides, marking a bitter standoff. After more than a year of sporadic violence and venomous public exchanges, Hamas carried out a brutal, lightning coup that crushed the PA in Gaza. In June 2007, reports emerged of Palestinians being pushed off tall buildings to their death. Some Palestinians shot rival faction members point blank in the legs to ensure permanent disabilities. Human rights groups reported unlawful imprisonments and torture in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
This unresolved conflict has very serious consequences. For one, Washington and Jerusalem lack a legitimate interlocutor. As they negotiate with Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah faction, they only deal with the ruler of the West Bank (and it is disputable that Abbas even has control of that), and a party that lost the 2006 elections. If they negotiate with Hamas, the rulers of Gaza, they would be negotiating with a terrorist organization, which runs counter to the policies of both governments.
Perhaps a more serious policy challenge is the West Bank-Gaza Strip split. The Palestinians are now represented by two non-states and two non-governments. How can the international community regard them as one political unit?
My new book suggests that it is now the internecine Palestinian conflict—not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict—that represents the first and most obvious obstacle to regional peace. Once this thorny, under-reported conflict is settled, it may be possible to resume productive talks. So long as the Palestinians are a house divided, peace will almost certainly be elusive.
11/14/2008
Hamas vs. Fatah
Frontpage Interview
by Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
November 14, 2008
Frontpage Interview's guest today is Jonathan Schanzer, director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center. He has served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury and as a research fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of the new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine. Daniel Pipes wrote the foreword to the book and some of the research was undertaken at Pipes' Middle East Forum.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
Schanzer: Great to be with you again, Jamie.
FP: What inspired you to write this book?
Schanzer: During the violent Hamas conquest of Gaza in the summer of 2007, during which hundreds of Palestinians were killed by their own, I was struck by how little attention the mainstream media gave these shocking events. Similarly, I noted that Middle Eastern studies professors stayed far away from the subject. It was as if observers of the Middle East were only interested in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is tired and well-worn ground. I quickly realized that there was an important book to be written.
FP: Why do you think the mainstream media and Middle Eastern studies professors stayed away from the Hamas conquest and Palestinians killing their own?
Schanzer: I believe the media steered clear of the Palestinian internecine violence for several reasons. First, this is a very nuanced conflict. Such stories are difficult to report, and even more difficult to sell to editors. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a much easier sell. So, that's where most of the media attention remained.
Second, reporting on this story is dangerous. The Palestinians generally wish to keep this very ugly story hidden from the public eye. In reporting on it, journalists risk invoking the ire of two violent organizations. Both Hamas and Fatah have threatened some of the journalists covering the story with violence. At minimum, these two groups restrict journalists' access if they are dissatisfied with previous reporting.
Another problem stems from visiting Western journalists' reliance on fixers. Fixers are individuals with local knowledge and good political connections who are paid to help our news reporters who don't know Arabic or how to gain interviews. It is my observation that the majority of Palestinian fixers whitewash the Palestinian civil war, and instead steer our journalist toward the same, tired stories about Palestinian suffering in the West Bank and Gaza.
As for the academy, this conflict has made it even clearer to me that Middle Eastern studies is a corrupted field. By not addressing this issue, professors of Palestinian history have shown that they are more interested in sniping at Israel and America than analyzing a significant problem that requires serious scholarship if peace is ever to be achieved in the Middle East. This bodes poorly for the future of a critical field.
FP: What is new about your book and what is its main argument?
Schanzer: I believe the book is unique because it challenges the very notion of Palestinian unity. The Palestinians are always described as one united people with one goal: statehood. My book debunks this. It explains that there is no coherent vision for a Palestinian future. Rather, the Hamas organization and the Fatah organization are locked in a bitter struggle for power that has paralyzed the Palestinians.
What is surprising to some people is that this conflict did not simply begin with the Hamas landslide electoral victory in January 2006. Rather, this struggle is two decades old, dating back to the outbreak of the first intifada of 1987. The book explains in detail how the two factions' Machiavellian designs on the territories have repeatedly led to regular bouts of violence.
In the end I conclude that, so long as this bitter conflict continues, it should be clear to policy makers that the Palestinians are not ready to rule themselves. Indeed, how can they? There are currently two separate Palestinian governments in two separate territories that are at war with each other.
It can even be argued that it is the Palestinian conflict – not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – that represents the largest obstacle to regional peace.
FP: How are the platforms of Hamas and Fatah different? How are they the same?
Schanzer: While Hamas is an ascetic Islamist organization and Fatah is more secular, the two groups are more similar than one might think.
Both groups were founded by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that seeks world Islamist domination. Indeed, Fatah is known as the Palestinian Liberation Movement, or Harakat al-Tahrir al-Falastiniya. Accordingly, the group's acronym should be HATAF. However, the founders reversed the order of the letters to Fatah, which has Quranic meaning (conquest).
It is also important to note that both organizations clearly state in their charters that they seek the destruction of the state of Israel.
FP: So what is it exactly that Hamas and Fatah disagree about? They both hate Jews and both want to annihilate Israel. So what's their problem with each other?
Schanzer: While Fatah is more secular and Hamas is undoubtedly Islamist, these two organizations are not that dissimilar. As you note, they both harbor deep anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist ideologies. Hamas and Fatah are locked in a struggle for control of political and economic power. Both see the potential to gain immense power and wealth if a Palestinian state is ever to be declared. The irony is that as long as they fight each other, and as long as they continue to seek to destroy Israel, that state will never come into existence.
FP: What are the consequences of the battle between Hamas and Fatah?
Schanzer: There are very serious consequences. First, Israel does not have an interlocutor. If it negotiates with Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah organization, it is only dealing with the ruler of the West Bank (and it is disputable that Abbas even has control of that). If Israel were to negotiate with Hamas, it would be negotiating with a terrorist organization. This will not happen.
Washington is in the same bind. While it continues to work with Fatah, it is understood that Fatah does not necessarily represent the Palestinian people.
It must also be noted that the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is a serious consequence of the Palestinian civil war. These are now two non-states and two non-governments. How can the international community regard them as one political unit?
In short, the Palestinians are in complete disarray. Nothing can be negotiated until this conflict is settled.
FP: How can the Palestinians break their own self-destructive cycle?
Schanzer: The Palestinians need to come to the realization that this civil war is the result of their support for two terrorist factions. Both Hamas and Fatah gained power through terrorist violence and then gravitated toward politics. This is always a prescription for failed governance.
More broadly, the Palestinians need to come to the conclusion that, until now, the dominant ideologies in the territories have been geared toward the destruction of the state of Israel, rather than the creation of a Palestinian state. This is a prescription for more violence – both among Palestinian factions and with Israel.
To be fair, there are a few non-violent Palestinian parties that Palestinians can support. Among them are the "Third Way" party and "Wasstiya." Unfortunately, they enjoy very little backing at this point. Still, they have non-violent ideologies and seek to build rather than destroy.
If the Palestinians were to reject both Hamas and Fatah and support these new parties, it would be a step toward breaking their self-destructive cycle.
FP: How do you grade American and Israeli policy toward Hamas and Fatah up till now?
Schanzer: Analysts have voiced grave concerns about the Bush administration's support for Fatah, since its charter still clearly states that it seeks Israel's destruction. But the administration is likely backing the Fatah organization as a counterweight to Iran, which claims Hamas as one of its proxies.
Analysts also question the wisdom of pushing for peace at this time, primarily because both factions openly seek Israel's destruction. I believe that until the Palestinians renounce violence and resolve their civil war, peace will be elusive.
FP: So what Israeli and U.S. policy do you support in the near future? Do you think the upcoming Obama administration shows positive or negative sighs of being able to deal with the situation prudently and effectively?
Schanzer: Until now, the incoming Obama administration's Middle East advisors have shown little understanding of this vexing policy challenge. Indeed, none of them have written about this issue, or have even raised it in a serious way.
It should be clear to them, as it is clear to me, that as long as the Palestinians are warring, there is no Palestinian interlocutor for peace. It is my sincere hope that the next administration grasps this reality. If it does not, there will be yet another failed round of Middle East diplomacy. This is dangerous. As we have seen in the past, failed diplomacy can often lead to renewed conflict.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, thank you for joining Frontpage Interview.
Schanzer: Thank you Jamie.
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz's Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com.
Frontpage Interview
by Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
November 14, 2008
Frontpage Interview's guest today is Jonathan Schanzer, director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center. He has served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury and as a research fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of the new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine. Daniel Pipes wrote the foreword to the book and some of the research was undertaken at Pipes' Middle East Forum.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
Schanzer: Great to be with you again, Jamie.
FP: What inspired you to write this book?
Schanzer: During the violent Hamas conquest of Gaza in the summer of 2007, during which hundreds of Palestinians were killed by their own, I was struck by how little attention the mainstream media gave these shocking events. Similarly, I noted that Middle Eastern studies professors stayed far away from the subject. It was as if observers of the Middle East were only interested in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is tired and well-worn ground. I quickly realized that there was an important book to be written.
FP: Why do you think the mainstream media and Middle Eastern studies professors stayed away from the Hamas conquest and Palestinians killing their own?
Schanzer: I believe the media steered clear of the Palestinian internecine violence for several reasons. First, this is a very nuanced conflict. Such stories are difficult to report, and even more difficult to sell to editors. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a much easier sell. So, that's where most of the media attention remained.
Second, reporting on this story is dangerous. The Palestinians generally wish to keep this very ugly story hidden from the public eye. In reporting on it, journalists risk invoking the ire of two violent organizations. Both Hamas and Fatah have threatened some of the journalists covering the story with violence. At minimum, these two groups restrict journalists' access if they are dissatisfied with previous reporting.
Another problem stems from visiting Western journalists' reliance on fixers. Fixers are individuals with local knowledge and good political connections who are paid to help our news reporters who don't know Arabic or how to gain interviews. It is my observation that the majority of Palestinian fixers whitewash the Palestinian civil war, and instead steer our journalist toward the same, tired stories about Palestinian suffering in the West Bank and Gaza.
As for the academy, this conflict has made it even clearer to me that Middle Eastern studies is a corrupted field. By not addressing this issue, professors of Palestinian history have shown that they are more interested in sniping at Israel and America than analyzing a significant problem that requires serious scholarship if peace is ever to be achieved in the Middle East. This bodes poorly for the future of a critical field.
FP: What is new about your book and what is its main argument?
Schanzer: I believe the book is unique because it challenges the very notion of Palestinian unity. The Palestinians are always described as one united people with one goal: statehood. My book debunks this. It explains that there is no coherent vision for a Palestinian future. Rather, the Hamas organization and the Fatah organization are locked in a bitter struggle for power that has paralyzed the Palestinians.
What is surprising to some people is that this conflict did not simply begin with the Hamas landslide electoral victory in January 2006. Rather, this struggle is two decades old, dating back to the outbreak of the first intifada of 1987. The book explains in detail how the two factions' Machiavellian designs on the territories have repeatedly led to regular bouts of violence.
In the end I conclude that, so long as this bitter conflict continues, it should be clear to policy makers that the Palestinians are not ready to rule themselves. Indeed, how can they? There are currently two separate Palestinian governments in two separate territories that are at war with each other.
It can even be argued that it is the Palestinian conflict – not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – that represents the largest obstacle to regional peace.
FP: How are the platforms of Hamas and Fatah different? How are they the same?
Schanzer: While Hamas is an ascetic Islamist organization and Fatah is more secular, the two groups are more similar than one might think.
Both groups were founded by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that seeks world Islamist domination. Indeed, Fatah is known as the Palestinian Liberation Movement, or Harakat al-Tahrir al-Falastiniya. Accordingly, the group's acronym should be HATAF. However, the founders reversed the order of the letters to Fatah, which has Quranic meaning (conquest).
It is also important to note that both organizations clearly state in their charters that they seek the destruction of the state of Israel.
FP: So what is it exactly that Hamas and Fatah disagree about? They both hate Jews and both want to annihilate Israel. So what's their problem with each other?
Schanzer: While Fatah is more secular and Hamas is undoubtedly Islamist, these two organizations are not that dissimilar. As you note, they both harbor deep anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist ideologies. Hamas and Fatah are locked in a struggle for control of political and economic power. Both see the potential to gain immense power and wealth if a Palestinian state is ever to be declared. The irony is that as long as they fight each other, and as long as they continue to seek to destroy Israel, that state will never come into existence.
FP: What are the consequences of the battle between Hamas and Fatah?
Schanzer: There are very serious consequences. First, Israel does not have an interlocutor. If it negotiates with Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah organization, it is only dealing with the ruler of the West Bank (and it is disputable that Abbas even has control of that). If Israel were to negotiate with Hamas, it would be negotiating with a terrorist organization. This will not happen.
Washington is in the same bind. While it continues to work with Fatah, it is understood that Fatah does not necessarily represent the Palestinian people.
It must also be noted that the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is a serious consequence of the Palestinian civil war. These are now two non-states and two non-governments. How can the international community regard them as one political unit?
In short, the Palestinians are in complete disarray. Nothing can be negotiated until this conflict is settled.
FP: How can the Palestinians break their own self-destructive cycle?
Schanzer: The Palestinians need to come to the realization that this civil war is the result of their support for two terrorist factions. Both Hamas and Fatah gained power through terrorist violence and then gravitated toward politics. This is always a prescription for failed governance.
More broadly, the Palestinians need to come to the conclusion that, until now, the dominant ideologies in the territories have been geared toward the destruction of the state of Israel, rather than the creation of a Palestinian state. This is a prescription for more violence – both among Palestinian factions and with Israel.
To be fair, there are a few non-violent Palestinian parties that Palestinians can support. Among them are the "Third Way" party and "Wasstiya." Unfortunately, they enjoy very little backing at this point. Still, they have non-violent ideologies and seek to build rather than destroy.
If the Palestinians were to reject both Hamas and Fatah and support these new parties, it would be a step toward breaking their self-destructive cycle.
FP: How do you grade American and Israeli policy toward Hamas and Fatah up till now?
Schanzer: Analysts have voiced grave concerns about the Bush administration's support for Fatah, since its charter still clearly states that it seeks Israel's destruction. But the administration is likely backing the Fatah organization as a counterweight to Iran, which claims Hamas as one of its proxies.
Analysts also question the wisdom of pushing for peace at this time, primarily because both factions openly seek Israel's destruction. I believe that until the Palestinians renounce violence and resolve their civil war, peace will be elusive.
FP: So what Israeli and U.S. policy do you support in the near future? Do you think the upcoming Obama administration shows positive or negative sighs of being able to deal with the situation prudently and effectively?
Schanzer: Until now, the incoming Obama administration's Middle East advisors have shown little understanding of this vexing policy challenge. Indeed, none of them have written about this issue, or have even raised it in a serious way.
It should be clear to them, as it is clear to me, that as long as the Palestinians are warring, there is no Palestinian interlocutor for peace. It is my sincere hope that the next administration grasps this reality. If it does not, there will be yet another failed round of Middle East diplomacy. This is dangerous. As we have seen in the past, failed diplomacy can often lead to renewed conflict.
FP: Jonathan Schanzer, thank you for joining Frontpage Interview.
Schanzer: Thank you Jamie.
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz's Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com.
